

THE DEMISE AND RISE OF THE TERRITORIAL STATE IN AFRICA

AKIIKI B. MUJAJU*

To talk in terms of the demise and rise of the territorial states in Africa is obviously paradoxical for we all know that since the disintegration of colonial empires, Africa has seen the emergence of the territorial states. It is even more perplexing when it is viewed from a historical perspective. John Herz, in an essay on this subject, indicated that, as the unifying force of the vast Roman Empire disintegrated, and later the pervasive supreme power of the Roman Catholic church gave away to territorialism, the territory as a protective unit was enhanced.¹ It became an instrument of order and security. The money economy and the invention of gunpower increased the defensibility of the state, while the emergence of complex economic relationships increased political control in the area.

International relations were based on the sovereignty of the collective entity, the territory, and international law came to reflect the "territoriality" of the unit and to take into account its sovereignty rather than to control and direct it. The state therefore operated in a set of relations which acknowledged its impregnability as a unit. Herz argues that, even when the state was threatened and joined a defensive collective security system, it was not for the surrender but re-enforcement of territorial sovereignty. Thus, the League Covenant and the Charter of the United Nations guarantee the territoriality of states.

To Herz, therefore, it is modern developments which have brought doubt about the impregnability of the territorial state. Among these are: economic interdependence of nations which compromises national sovereignty and neutralizes the state as a fully functional entity; the possibility of annihilation in a nuclear warfare which makes nonsense the claim that the state is now the security unit. Nor does ideological and political penetration in the twentieth century recognize territorial boundaries. I do not intend to examine all these in their relation to Africa. I only wish to note that in Europe the state becomes the hope of its citizens and that only twentieth century events have dramatized its demise. Yet in this paper I intend to argue that in Africa the reverse has been the case that the territorial state started by being questioned as a viable idea and that only recent events have dramatized its notorious presence.²

THE AFRICAN STATE AT INDEPENDENCE

The odds against my point of departure appear to be great. One sees everywhere that the state in Africa, far from being fully questioned from its inception,

*Akiiki B. Mujaju Lecturer Department of Political Science, Makerere University, Kampala.

was the inspiration of the nationalists who fought for it and used it as a medium of attaining freedom, and have since shown indications of protecting it, perhaps even of projecting it. Hurried membership to the United Nations on independence which became a feature of newly independent states symbolized the new status, the new sovereignty. Thus, while the Sudan had no hesitation to join the UN in 1956 when it was granted independence, it did not opt for membership of Commonwealth. While Ghana joined both, Nkrumah was quick to justify membership of the Commonwealth by quoting the consultative nature of its sovereign members.³ Nor did Sudan join Egypt as had been expected. Every African state has opened up Embassies or High Commissions in the case of commonwealth members in major capitals of the world; the national anthem, the national flag have been held in high esteem. All these symbolize the statehood of a country and, perhaps more than that, they seek to invoke an emotional response from the citizens.

One of the observers on developments in Africa has noted the difficulties that African states experience in evolving a foreign policy. Professor Cowen has written that, "for newly independent African states, the creation of a foreign policy position to go with their sovereign states has meant embarking on a voyage in rough and uncharted seas". The implication here is that foreign policy gives meaning to sovereignty. While I do not consider that the sole purpose of foreign policy in Africa is to be seen in this light and as an exhibitionist exercise, it is clear that element is ever present especially in an age that is ridden by power politics such as is the 20th century. Even if this was not the case, a foreign policy can express the economic, security and political interests of state. Consequently it is possible to suggest that an African state could not labour itself, for the benefit of the demise of the state but for the benefit of strengthening it.

These implications which are to be drawn from establishment of a national flag, a national anthem, evolution of a foreign policy, establishment of embassies and membership of the United Nations can be reinforced by more direct commitments which African states have made since independence.

Take for example membership of the United Nations. The UN charter provides that matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states are external to the responsibilities of the United Nations. It is, of course, true that, in so far as the African states have been a party to the renunciation of this provision as applied against the apartheid policies in South and South West Africa and the colonial question in respect of Portugal, they seem to have indicated that a state should not bar UN action on the pretext of safeguarding the principle of domestic jurisdiction.

But the principle of one state one vote to which African states have been committed seems to suggest that African states are equally committed to territorial indivisibility.

Indeed it was the voting power which by 1962 the one state one vote principle had accorded to the African states in the General Assembly of the UN, and its

effective application by these states that brought Western disenchantment with the new states. Thus, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, then Foreign Minister of Britain, spoke of the crisis of confidence at the United Nations where, as Ali Mazrui has observed, "a touch of absurdity in a situation in which little tribes have the same say as some of the older giants have in international politics" was discerned. If Home's fears were representative of the feelings felt by older states on this subject, then, it is possible to argue that the African states at the United Nations became the champions of at least one vital article of a charter the genesis and content of which had not been their responsibility.

Furthermore, the African states, in conference after conference in Africa, declared respect and adherence to the charter of the United Nations, the principle of equality of states, big and small and, more important, the idea that one state must never interfere in the internal affairs of other states. Adherence to these principles is clearly evident in the Sanniquelli joint declaration by President Tubman, Prime Minister Nkrumah and President Toure, of Liberia, Ghana, Guinea respectively made in Liberia in 1959. The first conference of Independent African states held in Ghana in 1958 had resolved to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity and this was to be the persistent theme of such conferences culminating in the formation of the OAU in 1963. This does not of course mean that there were no disagreements, for some states were more anxious to create a "Union" of African states than to preserve territorial integrity⁵ as will be shown later.

The charter of the Organisation of African Unity itself provides, like the UN charter, that member states solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to, among others, "the sovereign equality of all member states; non interference in the internal affairs of other states and respect for the sovereign and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence." Since these were raised to the level of principles to which members of the OAU made express commitments, it may sound rather absurd to suggest that the beginnings of the African state system were characterized by the demise rather than the acclamation of the indivisibility of the state; nor does the idea of adopting the traditional canons of diplomatic intercourse such as enunciated in the UN charter and brilliantly reproduced in the OAU charter suggest the demise of the African territorial state.

EVIDENCE OF DEMISE

Yet, in this article, it is my argument that, however elaborate these symbols of statehood might appear to be and, restated as is the affirmation of the territorial states, they do not in my view, constitute a total commitment to the state as was the case with the beginnings of states in Europe. The state in Africa did not get the unanimous acclaim of being the fulfilment of a hope, not even from its leaders until later on⁶

It is important to start off by looking at the international environment which welcomed the new states of Africa. True, this environment included the United

Nations with its largely idealistic Charter, providing for the equality of state sovereignties. It also included the recognition of the state as the basic unit of international discourse; but the same environment also included the recognition that ideology ideas and sentiments know no territorial boundaries; thus the idea that subject peoples must be free was as much a local matter as it was an international concern. Economic relationships of the twentieth century are much more interstate, very often intra-state than they ever have been in history. All these have surely compromised, internationally, the idea of territorial indivisibility. The capacity of a state as an administrative unit, committed to discharging its protective and other social functions to its citizens, can no longer be assessed in terms of the narrow confines of the territory.

Consequently, on achieving independence in 1957, Ghana and almost every African leader there-after emerged into an ideological ferment, a ferment that had started the age of colonial dismemberment. This included ideas of freedom, the feeling that to be independent and at the same time be idle to the indignities to which fellow Africans were being subjected in Africa was unacceptable. Nkrumah himself had stated that the independence of Ghana would be meaningless unless it was followed by independence of other African States. To reverse the position of poverty and weakness in relation to the developed countries was another aspect of the post independent ideological ferment in Africa. It was increasingly seen that the state that was offered independence was not a viable enough entity to realize these ideas and the case of a greater, more meaningful and beneficial unity was made.

Indeed, such was the concern for this greater unity that it became increasingly difficult to foresee the real place in inter-African relations of the state as it existed in Africa. It is this uncertainty regarding the State which constitutes its very demise in what would otherwise appear to be its post independence triumph. The craving for the Community of independent African states may have been compromised by Tubman's insistence on territorial sovereignty; the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union may have been killed by the defiance of the territorial state; it does nevertheless indicate that far from lifting its head to assert its freedom, the post independence state was subordinated to a search for something more viable, more meaningful. The continued existence of the State was regarded as a grace to colonial balkanization and confirmation of artificial, colonial boundaries. Lest these should prevail, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tunisia, Egypt had clauses in their national constitutions which provide for partial or total surrender of territorial sovereignty to something greater than a state either on regional or African continental basis.⁷

The idea, therefore, that colonialism should quit Africa, that there should be justice in the world, that years of racial prejudice and rejection which were imposed on Africa must give way to a resurgence of Africa—an Africa that is both United and respectable—all these emanated from the concept of pan-Africanism and negritude, and created a nationalism that almost rejected the state before its sovereignty was assured. Individually the African state, it may

be emphasized, was too small, too ineffective for the attainment of Africa's grand objectives. It may, of course, be suggested that not all African States hold the ideas of Unity in equally high esteem; that there have been the so-called radical and moderate states so characterized by their disposition to the pace and content of African Unity.

It is, however, important to remember that in 1959 Houphouet Boigny instigated an economic Conseil de l'Entente composed of Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey, apparently as a reaction to the Mali federation comprising Sudan Senegali that in the later years, the French speaking States excluding Guinea and Mali, the Brazzaville group of states transformed themselves into an economic organization called UAMCE and that the same states attempted a military collective security system in 1963.⁸ All these States were more or less hostile to the idea of a Union of States which Nkrumah was pushing. The fact that they were intent on forming all these groupings is an indication of their recognition of inadequacies of the territorial State. The formation of these groupings, even if they may have been motivated by the reaction against the more militant advocates of African unity, created a greater feeling of uncertainty about the abilities of the African State.

The "moderate" States just like the "radical" States were involved in a historical phenomenon, the phenomenon of creating natives out of the ruins of colonial injustice and down treading of the subject peoples and their values, and of reversing the situation by working for the dignity of the Africans. Something larger than the state was essential for this. The Action Group Policy paper in 1960 on the subject of a West African Union Stated that "negro States, though the last to come, are the first to use their brains for the conquest of the forces that have kept them apart,"⁹ This indicates the richness of the combative spirit of Africans and the desire to reverse the old order. This desire to refashion the past was present in the resolutions of the All African Peoples conference in Accra in 1958 when the conference rejected the artificial boundaries and advocated larger Pan African entities to remove the absurdities of overlapping tribes.

The desire to reframe Africa and to give it a newer meaning through unity did, of course, reach its heights in 1963 at the signing of the OAU charter when State Leader after another had echoed and re-echoed the theme of African Unity. There emerged what has been called the Addis Ababa spirit, "the spirit of brotherhood and understanding."

The Addis Ababa charter of course did not provide for a supra-national organization, it was nevertheless understood by some as a step towards such an entity. The charter talked of eradicating both colonialism and neo-colonialism. Yet nothing has been more difficult than to define and eradicate neo-colonialism. Not that it does not exist for it clearly does; and so too must exist agents of neo-colonialism. Tshombe was generally recognized as one in Zaire, formerly Congo. The trouble is that there are so many ways in which to justify and white-wash neo-colonialism; just as such words as the "white

man's burden" the "civilizing mission", "Humanitarianism" have been used to white-wash colonialism, so could sweet words such as self determination, territorial integrity white-wash Tshombe's drive for the foreign business's inspired secession of Katanga from the Republic of Zaire. A dependent or neo-colonial leadership therefore can very easily escape scrutiny because of the elusiveness of the concept neo-colonialism, and this was, I think, dramatized by the difficulties the African Statesmen had in trying to, if nothing else, at least, isolate Tshombe both as head of secessionist Katanga and later as Congolese Prime Minister. It would be idle to deny, then, that committing oneself to fight against neo-colonialism must include the possibility of interfering in the internal affairs of the state concerned. Many leaders in Africa have believed that the majority of the Franco-phone African leaders stand in a neo-colonial relationship with France,¹⁰ and fighting against them as the preamble of the OAU charter would appear to suggest, endangers the states over which these leaders preside. Thus when militant refugees from Ivory Coast and Togo resident in Ghana tried to use Ghana, without Nkrumah's reprimand, as a base for incursions into their respective "neo-colonial" states, it was in the name of the State that the leaders answered this challenge, and the threat by Boigny of Ivory Coast to boycott the 1965 OAU meeting in Accra was a response to these attempts to dislodge what the militants considered to be a neo-colonial leadership.

The point here is that African States came into existence when the role of ideas in shaping, and even conditioning, international events, was important. So important were these ideas in Africa that Nyerere in Tanzania, was prepared to forego, for a while, the Tanganyika independence if that action would have meant that an East African federation would have come about. But ideas were not the only forces that compromised the State's indivisibility. Economic and military considerations were important.

If the state is to be seen as a functional entity, protective to its citizens, its welfare functions require capabilities with roots beyond the state boundaries. Surely Africa had cause to feel this, for not only had its economics been oriented towards those of the colonial powers but action to correct the situation and develop was also believed to depend on foreign aid, again something beyond the state. It was therefore an uphill task to quench the thirst for the new, and for change to accompany the dawning of freedom to the Expectant people.

Thus the Community of Independent African States, the Ghana, Guinea Union, the Union of African States, Boigny's Entente, the Casablanca and Monrovia Groups, the attempts at a North African Federation in 1958 as borne out by the Tangier Conference of Istiglal Neo Destour and Algerian FLA, not to mention the East African Common Services Organization, have Economic undertones. The OAU itself climaxed the search for economic solutions on a continental basis. The economic and Social Commission, Education and cultural commission and Scientific Technical and research

Commission as well as the African Development Bank which are OAU's specialised agencies, have to be seen in that light.

Nor has the inability of the state to protect itself proved the viability of the state. The new born Congo state could not protect itself from its army mutiny; nor withstand the intrigue of the foreign business interests in the Congo; nor control the cold-war-ridden United Nations in the Congo; it could not even ensure the existence of its legitimate government. The Brazzaville States resorted to the formation of a military group (the UAMD); the army mutinies in Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika in 1964 could be offset in their repercussion apparently only by the requested arrival of the British troops. All these call into question the state as a protective unit. It is interesting to note that Nyerere's agony was not that his sovereign State had had to depend on foreign troops for restoring order. It was that the troops called upon to restore order were unAfrican, and this is emphasized by the cleansing conference of the OAU which met at his invitation in Dar es Salaam and assigned Nigerian troops to succeed British Troops in Tanganyika. The provision of the defence commission in the OAU charter though falling short of the Casablanca plan for an African High Command, indicates Africa's search for extra state security.

Yet, it has been questioned whether the African leaders really meant to have unity; whether the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union was not a publicity stunt; whether the Union of African states was not the height of irresponsible radicalism? Or whether the 1963 federation declaration by Kenyatta, Obote and Nyerere in East Africa was not a symbol of post independence pan-African emotion, or, as Kenyatta claimed later, whether it was not merely a device to hasten Kenya's independence.¹² One cannot be absolutely sure about all these; only the leaders and their advisers know with certainty, but a question may be asked. Can a call that has been so persistent, a goal so eloquently elaborated not just by Nkrumah as has often misleadingly been implied, but most, if not all, African leaders be so devoid of conviction? In speech after speech, the African Heads of State at their Addis Ababa meeting in 1963 echoed and re-echoed this unity idea; they even signed, unanimously, a charter amidst speculation that they probably would not agree on one. So great were the problems of maintaining sovereignty, so compelling was the need for co-operation and unity between states, that it is safe to suggest that the African leaders were well intentioned in their call for unity. The question arises then as to why, despite commitment to unity, no significant in-roads have been made to achieve it? Here then lies the other aspect of this essay—the "rise" of the territorial state in Africa.

THE STATE ASSERTS ITSELF

The paradox of course, continues. I began by referring to indications that the African state was asserted. But I have at the same time indicated that along side this seeming assertion of the state were ideas, convictions and actions

regarding something bigger, more powerful and more functional than the individual state which very greatly counteracted these appearances of commitments to state sovereignty.

It is to be noted that of the reasons for the prevalence of ideologies and sentiments which transcend territorial boundaries, economic interdependence and defence requirements are almost a reproduction of Herz's arguments of the demise of the territorial state in Europe. Having emerged into an international community that was already experiencing a strain on a territorial level, it is no wonder that the emergent African states should have felt a similar strain and looked outwards for hope. Dependence on foreign aid, technical assistance and military aid, possession economies that, were undiversified and the desire that these colonial legacies must be discarded brought into focus the futility of the indivisibility of the territorial state and gave momentum to notions of continental unification. But the point now is that while all these still remain, the State seems to have notoriously defied them and, rather than accept subordination and oblivion, it craves for impression, thus reversing Herz's chronology of events in Europe.

One of the characteristics of the Addis Ababa spirit in 1963 was the mixed interpretation of the ultimate status of the OAU. There were those who saw the OAU as a basis for more meaningful unity. That it received unanimous adoption at the conference was a source of hope to those who thought in this vein. There were those, however, who felt that it was as far as they could go, the end of the road. Those who thought the OUA was an instrument for a consolidated unity had reason to welcome the subsequent dissolution of the Casablanca and Monrovia groups, as well as the Pafmesca group, as they must have when in 1964 UAM was transformed into a partly economic organization, OCAM. But by 1965 things had changed; OCAM was increasingly taking on a more political posture with its admission of Burundi and of Tshombe to whom a number of the remainder of African leaders were uncompromisingly opposed. The threat by these states, especially Ivory Coast to boycott the 1965 Accra Conference of OAU on the grounds that Nkrumah, the host President was harbouring refugee elements who were using Ghana as a sanctuary for subversive activities against their countries of origin, was only a symptom of the divergence of attitudes among African leaders as to the meaning of OAU and ultimately the role of the state. In a subsequent council of ministers meeting (1966) in Addis Ababa, there were sharp disagreements on such things as a Pan-African news agency and the wisdom or otherwise of having called for the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Britain by the Council of Ministers of the OAU in 1965. So enraged was Nyerere of Tanzania after the Heads of State meeting that followed that he accused a devil of having infested Africa. Milton Obote was later to agree with Nyerere, although General Ankara of Ghana did not, that continued indebtedness to metropolitan powers in a compromise on African States free hand in African affairs. Foreign Minister Odaka of Uganda stillurated the frustration of a number of the leaders:

"The OAU was established as a beginning to an end; yet there are those who would rather see it become the end of the beginning . . . Yet OAU is not the unity sought for, but the beginning of a long march to Unity".

Odaka went on to explain what was perhaps the main reasons for this development.

"A second reason why the OAU members have so far failed to achieve the objectives embodied in the charter is that the charter is also at pains to preserve national sovereignty".¹³

The curious aspect about Odaka's complaints is that the provision for the protection of national sovereignty was not a late addition, it was in the initial draft of the charter. Yet it had not invited this kind of reaction in 1963. The reason, I suggest, was that there was the hope that the territorial state's image would continue to fade, thus allowing for greater surrender of sovereignties. But by 1966 when Odaka as well as Nyerere and Obote made their comments, things had begun to change and the territorial state, far from giving way, had blocked progress towards firmer unification.

It appears as if the transcendental sentiments of decolonization, of removing neo-colonialism, of remaking the racially down-trodden African of the past did not prove strong enough to inspire leaders to joint action and advance to unification. On the contrary, aided by the attachments to former colonial powers and mindful of their economic interests with the west, the Ocam states as well as other inhibited joint African action on such things as reacting to cold war elements in the Congo crisis or the implementation of the OAU resolution to sever relations with Britain on the Rhodesian crisis.

It does appear, then, that ideas have not, after all, brought completely into question the territorial state. But neither, as far as intra-African relations are concerned, have economic and defence considerations done so, after all. Despite its economic potential, Africa does not appear to have shown a ready economic capability to offset the individual state indebtedness to the more industrialized states of the world. Too much commitment to African unity seems too hazardous a course and states would rather go along with bilateral aid arrangements with the industrialized countries, at the expense of taking joint actions on sensitive issues such as Rhodesia. Whatever achievements have been recorded by the specialized Commissions of the OAU, they are not significant, given Africa's potential in these fields. The most noteworthy exception is the trans African highway which, moreover ten years after the formation of OAU, is only at the planning stage.

Nor have the recent trends regarding the boundaries shown that the state is on the decline. The original solution to the problem of boundaries was provided by All African Peoples Conference in Accra in 1958. And it was this: that the artificial boundaries were an absurdity. That they must be rejected as an unnecessary colonial legacy, and that African Unity would be the answer to dissected tribes. By 1964, however, after the Algeria Morocco boundary dispute,

the Ewe question between Ghana and Togo and the Kenya Somali-Ethiopia boundary dispute, the problem of boundaries seemed to confound all expectations of unity. The OAU meeting in Cairo in 1964 was reduced to deciding that the colonial boundaries should be accepted by the states, while the OAU itself provided machinery only for the mediation, conciliation and arbitration, but naturally with concurrent agreement of the parties to the dispute on any proposed solution to a boundary dispute.¹⁴ The 1967 agreement between Kenya and Somalia over their boundary while it took place under the OAU auspices through the mediation of President Kaunda in Arusha in Tanzania, was more a result of good neighbourly policy of the Eastern African States adopted since 1966. As a matter of fact at this meeting when Kaunda mediated between Kenya and Somalia, both President Obote of Uganda and the host President Nyerere, were in Arusha as symbols of a good neighbourly policy between sovereign states. Thus the States emerges prominently.

Nor did the 1963 Federation declaration by the three East African Leaders and the subsequent talks by the working party on the constitution ultimately threaten the state structure, for no such federation emerged. Instead, disagreement among the parties as to the division of power between the federal and state governments and the distribution of economic benefits therein, left the state triumphant. As a matter of fact when defending Uganda's go slow policy on Federation. Adiko Nekyon, the Uganda's Minister of Information and Broadcasting contended that he was not prepared to take his country into darkness. Although an East African Economic Community now does exist succeeding the former East African Common Services Organization, much like the efforts to create, an Economic Community in West Africa¹⁵ it is in no way a threat to territorial sovereignty. On the contrary, disagreements between Member States have since 1971 consistently threatened the very foundation of the Community, thus showing that it exists at the mercy of those states. With regard to the OAU itself the events leading from the coup in Uganda 1971 have shown that member states have strenuously tried to curb even the most minimal of powers which the OAU Secretariat seemed to be acquiring, by constantly asserting the sovereignty of Member states and the consultative nature of the OAU.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, let us note that it is perhaps to be expected that emerging into a world community that recognized the quality of states at the UNO, but which also acclaims economic and Military power, the African states initially had to pursue sovereignty but at the same time question the territoriality of their states. The requirements of a modern state are such as to emphasize economic consideration in the formulation of policy. Thus the Britain of 1950's which rejected the Rome Treaty terms for eventual political unification for the EEC has given way for the Britain of 1960's and 1970's which has yielded to its economic pressures and has sought, almost begged, for entry

into the EEC. Thus, unlike Herz's European states, the African states realized rather early that in unity, not in sovereignty, lies strength. It is, however, one of the ironies of history that rather than learn from the experience themselves, perhaps to see what it tastes like to go through it. Rather than forge ahead in unity, states have yielded to the narrow interests of statehood, just to see whether they cannot really make it on their own.

Yet one may be persuaded to be sympathetic, for to people who have fought and often gone to prison for the independence of their states, the interests of their states and often their own political interests are an important consideration. Nor is this all. With the boundaries of the states so uncertain, with government power unable to penetrate through the lower layers of society, with even the existence of the state and the legitimacy of its government brought into question by particularistic tendencies of its subnational entities, it is not surprising that, rather than go ahead to large supra-national organizations on a continental or sub-continental basis, leaders would ensure the survival of their state, consolidate its cohesion and integrate its peoples.¹⁶

Here then lies the explanation for the current re-surgence of a territorial state in Africa. What is absurd however, is that, while within Africa the state has re-established its claim to sovereignty, the same state so far as its economic relations with extra African nations are concerned survives in a subordinate status. Thus, the current rise of the territorial state in Africa is only an aspect of the states fortunes in Africa. The choice must be made whether Africa wants to exploit its own energies in joint continental or Regional endeavours in an atmosphere of freedom and independence since this will entail disengagement from metropolitan connections, or reject joint action in Africa in pursuit of individual statehood, independent of the rest of Africa though dependent on external masters.

FOOTNOTES

1. John Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State", in Rosenau, J., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. pp. 80-86. Reprinted from *World Politics*, Vol. IX 1957, pp. 473-493.
2. This essay is concerned with intra-African relations, not relations with metropolitan countries with which African states exist in a dependent relationship, and as a result of which it could be advanced that the African State is actually yet to "rise". On these questions of dependence, see K. Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism, the last stage of Imperialism*, London, Nelson, 1965.
3. G. Gowan, "Political Determinants" in V MCKay (ed) *African Diplomacy* New York: Dracger, 1966 p. 119.
4. Ali A. Mazrui, *Towards A Pax Africana*, Chicago. See also his "The UN and some African political attitudes" *International Organization* Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1964.
5. These declarations have been reprinted in Colin Legum *Pan Africanism*, New York, Praeger, 1965, Appendices 4,5,7,9 and Quaison Sekey, *Africa Unbound* New York, Praeger, 1965, pp. 72-78.
6. Did Dr. Nkrumah's dictum of "Seek, first the political Kingdom . . ." mean that he wanted the states because it could give way to greater things? For his vision was that

- an all-Africa Union would supercede the individual state. One answer is that, in fact Nkrumah saw the states' viability in a wider context of Unity.
7. K. Nkrumah, *Africa must Unite* N.Y. Praeger, 1964, p. 149 for an alternative approach to Unity by J. Nyerere, See "A United States of Africa" *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 1 No. 1, 1963 p. 2,3.
 8. On these developments see W. Zartman, *International Relations in the West African*. Anglewood Cliffs N. J. Prentice-Hall, 1966 ch. 1.
 9. Action Group was the ruling party in Western Nigeria up to the ill-fated election of 1964 in that Region, and was, up to the coup in 1966, the opposition party in the Federal Parliament. Statement quoted by Ali Z. Mazrui in *Towards a pax-Africana*, p. 86.
 10. The ofei foreignness of the secession demand is mentioned by CC. Obron in "A critical analysis of the Nigerian Crisis", *Pan African Journal* Vol. 1, No. 1, 1968, p. 37 and is greatly developed in his to *Katanga and Back* New York, Universal Library, 1966.
 11. This was clearly Nkrumah's View, See his *Neo-Colonialism, the last stage of imperialism* it was indirectly expressed by Nyerere and Obote in 1966 after the OAU meeting as will be mentioned later.
 12. See Donald Rothchild in "East African Federation" his *Politics in Africa*, New York Harcourt Brace, 1966.
 13. Sam Odaka "The Problems facing the Organization of African Unity" a paper read at the Carnegie Institute of Diplomacy, Makerere University College, August, 1966.
 14. Commission and the Secretariat have been ineffectual in *International Organization*, Vol. XXI, No. 3.
 15. See D. Rothchild, *Political in Africa* p. 223. In 1968, the Entente's states Ivory Coast, Dahomey Niger and Togo. in fact boycotted the Monrovia meeting establishing the West African Regional group, New York Times, April 25th 1968 p. 12.
 16. The efforts in Africa to consolidate states and deal with disintegrative subnationalisms—in Uganda in 1966, Nigeria in 1968 etc, are indications of these constraints.