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MAU MAU: WAS IT A NATIONALIST OR TRIBAL MOVEMENT?

SEMAKULA KIWANUKA

During the last quarter of the century, there has been a tremendous increase in the study of African politics by western and eastern scholars. The 1960s saw an equally growing body of African scholars who devoted their energies to political developments in Africa. This interest was not unconnected with the use of African nationalism and the subsequent independence of many African countries from the late 1950s to the mid 1960s. Such interest in Africa was motivated by academic as well as non academic reasons. For the academics, Africa and its people became testing grounds of the many theories and concepts which had developed as a result of the expansion of the Social Sciences in general and of political Science in particular. There was a need to test whether African nationalist movements as well as African leaders conformed to the prevailing "development" theories and concepts which had been developed in North America and Europe. Both the eastern and the western scholars took pains to identify characteristics in the nationalist movements which conformed to the prevailing assumptions of this ideology.

This article sets out to examine the falsity or validity of the western concept of African nationalism. The political historiography of Africa reveals two widely spread but unfortunately false assumptions. The first assumption is that the African nationalist movements were mass movements. The second assumption which actually rises from the first was that such movements which qualified for the title of "nationalist" covered the whole territory, that is the future nation. Consequently the assumption that party politics was a mass movement has led to the popularization of the concept of a mass party as the instrument which won back African independence.

Yet only a cursory analysis of the membership and voting returns of many political parties in Africa with the possible exception of TANU in Tanzania and PAIG in GUINEA, shows that there were hardly any mass parties in Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s, i.e. on the eve of the independence of many African countries. Later on the parties acquired the mantle of "massness" partly due to improved organization but also due to fear of reprisals and victimization, political surveillance and preventive detention. But recent studies of Nkrumah's CPP, have amply demonstrated how exaggerated was the party's mass appeal and we need therefore to treat cautiously even the massness of later years of other parties.

A further examination of the current political historiography reveals

that because of the assumption that a nationalist movement embraces the whole population as well as the whole territory, scholars both African and non-African tend to deny early political movements, the status of political parties or even the claim to the status of being nationalist in outlook. How did this ideological approach to the study of African politics arise? It seems that this approach and attitude were the products of two unrelated factors. The first was the *unhistorical* and *unexamined* belief that a nationalist movement must be territory wide. It followed therefore that any movement which did not conform to this assumption could not be described as nationalist.

The same argument was applied to political movement especially those of the 1920s and 1930s. Another explanation for the growth of this kind of attitude towards African politics which owes its popularization to political scientists, was the generally non-empirical nature of political science as an academic discipline. This is why there are volumes of literature on Africa which assume that nationalist movements are nationwide both in terms of territory and membership or composition. This as we know is false not only in Africa but also in the context of European history. Any student of 19th century European history knows that the two dominant nationalist movements, that is the German and the Italian were neither nationwide nor were they joined by the masses.

In view of these facts why is it that the European or the American scholar has applied a different set of criteria and concepts to the study of Africa? In answer to this question, one suspects that racism and paternalism have been motivating influences. The reason why I say this is that whereas the white scholar is prepared to accept Prussian or Croatian or Turkish Cypriot political movements as nationalist, even though they were neither territorial wide nor mass movements, there is reluctance to accord similar status to African movements. To him these are tribes and not nations and the people are tribesmen. What then determines whether people are a nation or tribe? Is it their numbers or their culture or their dependent status? If it is a question of numbers, then the Scots, the Norwegians, the Luxemburghs, etc., no more qualify as nations than the Yoruba, the Ibo, the Bakongo: If it is culture, who determines the standard of a people's culture?

When we turn to the African scholar, we find that he has a problem arising out of the colonial impact. Because he was originally described as a tribesman, the African today goes to great lengths to demonstrate how untribal or detribalized he is. By that he implies he is a nationalist because he has risen from the low level of a tribe. This whole outlook colours his view of African politics and makes the same untenable assumption that for a political movement to be "nationalist" it must cover the whole territory and be embraced by all the people.

This leads me to the question posed in the title of this article. Was Mau Mau a tribal or nationalist movement? For those who subscribe to

the view, a false one, that a nationalist movement must be a mass movement, embracing the whole territory, Mau Mau was a tribal movement. They point to its base and its leadership and the territorial extent of Kenya it covered.

It should be clear to the reader that I regard such an interpretation as false. A movement should be judged by its ideology and not by who is in it. After all political consciousness and the ability to articulate issues do not and cannot reach the same level of maturity at the same time and everywhere in a single territory. This can be demonstrated by the question of land in colonial Kenya. Whereas the Maasai and the Kalenjin lost more land to the white man than the Kikuyu, the Kikuyu behaved as if they had lost most land. The reason was simply that the Kikuyu became more politically conscious of the injustices of colonial rule than some of their neighbours at a much earlier date. When they therefore protested against the alienation of African lands to the settlers, they were voicing a grievance which was generally of concern even to the less articulate peoples of Kenya. That is; though Kikuyu, they were voicing national issues.

Because of the belief that a nationalist movement must be a mass movement, the historians of Tanzania are at pains to portray the Tanganyika African Association, a Civil Servant Organisation as a mass organisation. Yet by its very nature, the TAA was concerned with elitist issues, which affected a small section of the population. That is the civil servants. To say this is not to deny it the status of a nationalist movement. Nationalism does not always pursue the same issues or issues which are universally supported by the population. Movements sometimes have limited objectives and many political parties during the struggle for independence were one issue, organisations. Their political platforms widened only after they had settled in the seats of power. Similarly many nationalists did not always speak with one voice, as the examples of Angola and Zimbabwe demonstrate today. Yet we cannot say that X is more nationalist than Y. Such a categorization will only reflect our ideological biases.

All this points to one obvious conclusion, that is, that nationalism means and it has always meant what the writers have chosen it to mean. Yet for an African scholar to ignore earlier political movement which came before the formation of the post-war parties is to narrow one's base of study unnecessarily. Similarly to deny leaders of such movements the status of nationalist is to perpetuate an unfounded myth that nationalist movements in history have always been territorial wide. Whether such organizations embraced the whole population or not, what we have to look for are the sentiments or ideals they expressed. The dominant political sentiments or the Mau Mau movement, were questions which concerned all Kenyans. That was the question of independence. To deny Mau Mau the status of a nationalist movement would be to imply that a nationalist movement must

be territory wide and be supported by all the people at the same time. But to argue this would be to commit a historical falsehood.

Another controversial aspect of Mau Mau, is its contribution to the winning of independence. There are two extreme views in the growing historiography of Kenya. One is that Mau Mau alone and its followers were responsible for the achievement of independence. The other view is that Mau Mau's contribution was marginal. It was rather the rise of the new political elite after the banning of KAU which brought about Kenya's independence. My view is that the success of the independence movement in any country comes as a result of the convergence of various forces. This was also true in Kenya. The post KAU nationalist leaders of the 1950s and early 1960s were no doubt a very important force.

Equally important was the presence in the Colonial Office from the late 1950s of a Colonial Secretary who recognized the wind of change "blowing across Africa" and believed in the inevitability of African independence. When the history of the decolonization of Zambia and Kenya is written, the name of Ian Macleod should never be forgotten. His brief tenure of the Colonial Office saw the dismantling of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and also the acceptance, perhaps for the first time in its history, of the fact that Kenya would no longer be a white man's country.

The third force was the Mau Mau movement. Mau Mau was crucial because it broke the back-bone of the settlers by dividing their ranks. This division between the Blundells, Bruce Mackenzies, etc., on the one hand and the Group Capt. Briggs, etc., on the other, was one of the most decisive moments in the history of Colonial Kenya. Mau Mau contributed in no small measure to this political process. Furthermore, Mau Mau focussed world attention on Kenya for more than any number of political party manifestoes would have done. We do not want to exaggerate the role of international opinion in the decolonization of Africa. But by internationalizing the question of Kenya's independence, the British lost the war though they won the battle in the forests. For this reason, history cannot ignore the contribution of those numerous semi-illiterate men in the forests to the winning of Kenya's independence.

SUBJECT MATTER AS A SOURCE OF EDUCATIONAL GOALS AND INSTRUCTIONAL OBJECTIVES: THE CASE FOR HISTORY IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS

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THE NEED FOR CLEAR EDUCATIONAL AND INSTRUCTIONAL OBJECTIVES

Imaginative planning and continuous improvement of an educational system crucially depends on a clear conception of the goals that are being aimed at. The educational goals become the criteria for selecting material, outlining content, and developing teaching methods and techniques. The objectives are also basically accountable for the nature of tests and examinations in the system. Clear educational and instructional goals are therefore a necessary pre-requisite for a competent educational system. All scholars and educationalists should work towards the realization of this feature.

In East Africa particularly in Uganda and Kenya, lack of clear educational and instructional ends has been easily one of the most apparent weaknesses in the countries' systems. In the early 1960's Kenya's Education Commission and Uganda's Castle Commission attempted, among other things, to identify the national educational goals. In both cases, however, these goals were too briefly and generally discussed. In Tanzania, the UNESCO Report of 1962 failed to effectively outline and discuss the implications of curriculum or educational aims although the 'Arusha Declaration' and Nyerere's "Education for Self Reliance" tried to improve the situation later on. Detailed five-year development plans were drawn in the three East African countries, but no similar planning was effected in curriculum, that might be necessary to help towards successful implementation of these plans. Moreover, virtually all the problems and needs identified, as well as the goals set, in the development plans were almost exclusively economical. Cultural and political considerations often received only passing mention.

Concern about this dearth of clear educational goals in East Africa has been loudly vocal. In 1967, for example, R. C. Honeybone, expressed the view that time had come for the planning of education to be co-ordinated by "some form of Permanent Planning Commission which would include politicians, economists, manpower planners, sociologists as well as educationists." According to Honeybone "changes will be more effective if public opinion is well informed and co-operative" (2). The Director of the Institute of Education, Professor Senteza-Kajubi (1968) advocated the formation of National Policy Commission "with the realisation that the devising of an


education system is not only complicated but also a very important task". Kajubi's commission was to focus its operation in the area where educational objectives were not clear.³ Furthermore, one of the central recommendations of the Annual Conference of the Uganda Education Association in 1969 was establishing an ad-hoc National Seminar to clarify issues and implications, and to set up a standing National Education Policy Committee that would play an advisory and consultative role in regard to the discussion and implementation of policy.

The relevance and potential value of the above advocated seminars committees or commissions for curricula improvement cannot be overstated. Unfortunately such organs have not yet become a reality in East Africa. Nevertheless, partly in spite of, and partly in view of the absence of these curricular assets, the writer submits that an increased examination of subject matter as a source of educational and instructional objectives by educationists will considerably widen the relevance and utility of curricula not only in East Africa but also in a number of other parts of the world.

SUBJECT MATTER AS A SOURCE OF EDUCATIONAL GOALS

Perhaps the most widely accepted and used scheme to develop curriculum is explicated in Ralph W. Tyler's *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction* which is popularly known as "The Tyler Rationale". In this book the author recommended that educational objectives should be derived from three data sources, namely the student or learner, society and subject matter. As implications for education emerge from the three data sources tentative general objectives are stated. These should be screened through the educational philosophy and psychology of learning that is accepted by the individual, group or nation that is developing the curriculum. It is assumed that out of the two screens, that is the philosophical and psychological, the curriculum designer will have only a few important and achievable objectives.

These must subsequently be stated in precise terms of measurable learner or student behaviour. Let us present Tyler's scheme diagrammatically for clarity:



Since I have already dealt elsewhere with the student and society as a source of educational and instructional objective⁴ I shall now be quick to examine how a subject in a given field can generate such goals.

Subject matter is the source of most objectives used in schools and colleges. They are incorporated in textbooks which usually contain the conception of the writers regarding what the school should attempt to achieve in that particular field. In deriving educational and instructional ends from subject matter, therefore, the view and co-operation of subject specialists are basically crucial.

The curricula developer must work hand in hand with a specialist or, preferably, a group of specialists in the field where objectives are sought. The specialist should begin by making an outline indicating his conception of the subject field, and then suggest ways in which the subject can be used for purposes of general education. His first job is to articulate what, in his view, his subject is and should try to accomplish.

In some subjects like history the task of establishing an operational conceptual framework of the subject is a particularly difficult one. Various historians have given different and often contradicting answers to questions like the following: What is history? Is it a factual record of the past? Is it contemporary society's version of what happened in the past? Is it a selection of these past happenings which seem significant now (or which seemed significant then?). It is possible to trace a pattern of evolution in history?

A brief examination of specific examples of reactions to the above questions will help reveal not only the difficulty involved in establishing a convincing operational philosophy of the subject of history, but also of the need to do so. According to Sir Charles Firth history is not only "a branch of learning that should be studied for its own sake, but a kind of knowledge which is useful to men in their daily life".⁵ J. Burchkardt basically makes the same point when he claims that "history is the record of what one age finds worthy of note in another—the past is only intelligible through the present".⁶ In the same vein Rowse shares the view that the effect of/studying history is to make one a realist, possibly a pessimist . . . but never a cynic".⁷ On the African front Joseph Ki-Zerbo was positive that "the teaching of history must promote the aspirations of African unity. History must develop an historical conscience according to African tradition"⁸ Francis Bacon was in a way summing up the positions of the above scholars when he declared that it "is history that make men wise".⁹

Some scholars, however, have increasingly less faith in the subject. T. F. Trout, for example, felt that "we investigate the past not to reduce practical political lessons but to find out what really happened". H. A. L. Fisher griped thus:

"Men wiser and more learned than I have discovered in history a plot, a rhythm, a pre-determined pattern. These harmonies are concealed

from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave, only one great fact with respect to which, since it is quite unique, there can be no generalizations, only one safe rule for the historian: that he should recognise in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen.”¹⁰

Hegel was depressingly similar to Fisher when he grumbled that the “one thing that one learns from history is that nobody ever learns from history”. Finally this dim view of history will probably never be more radical beyond Henry Ford’s designation that “history is bunk”.

The theme of conflict and controversy about the philosophy of history surfaces on a number of other fronts. For example, according to A. E. Housman, “to the historian accuracy is a duty not a virtue”. Sir George Clark, however, contends that “there is no objective historical truth”.¹²

It goes without saying therefore that in outlining his conception of what history should attempt to achieve in school historians must somehow safeguard or deal with the above or similar conflicting points.

There are two types of information required of a history specialist for the purpose of generating educational goals. First is a list of suggestions with regard to particular contributions history can make to other functions of the subject itself. From the suggested functions the curriculum developer should be able to infer a variety of important objectives relating to areas like knowledge, intellectual skills, ability and techniques to solve problems, attitudes and values, interest and so on.

Let us take one example to illustrate more specifically what has been discussed above. R. E. Crookall begins his book *Handbook for History Teachers in West Africa* with a chapter on the broad functions of History. Among these he enlisted the following:

1. Introducing children to their heritage.
2. Implanting moral values.
3. Quickening the imagination.
4. Laying the foundations of a tolerant outlook.
5. Imparting a sense of human solidarity.
6. Training the mind.
7. To give pleasure.
8. Providing for children’s growth.

As it was suggested already the curriculum designer should at the outset identify functions that are particularly unique to his field and those that are peripheral. Secondly he must determine the ability and age of the pupils for whom he is generating the objectives. This is important mainly because it facilitates selection of the right material and adoption of the most appropriate methods.

From the function of “Introducing children to their heritage” the following objectives can be inferred at the SI-II level:

Educational goal

1. Students will analyse the migration by the various ethnic groups of Uganda.
2. Students will examine the cultural aspects of various ethnic groups of Uganda.

Instructional Objectives

- (a) Students will be able to locate on a map the different places of origin of identified ethnic groups.
- (b) Students will be able to trace the various routes which the various ethnic groups might have followed to their new places of settlement.
- (a) Students will be able to enlist at least five musical instruments originally belonging to certain ethnic groups.
- (b) Students will name the main type of dance for the different ethnic groups.
- (c) Students will be able to compare and contrast the religious practices among certain identified ethnic groups.
- (d) Students will be able to write down at least three similar features between the style of Government of their own ethnic group and any other.
- (e) Students will point out any number of features they like or dislike about the government of any ethnic group other than theirs.

Regarding the function of “giving pleasure” the following objectives might be generated :

Educational goals

1. Students will develop a lively and active interest in reading history.

2. Students will appreciate the historical wealth of the museum.

Instructional Objectives.

- (a) Students will reveal some initiative to read a number of text-books on a historical theme.
- (b) Students will show their historical involvement by reading a variety of historical books during their spare time.
- (a) Students will be able to compile a list of items found in the museum that relate to Ugandan indigenous music.
- (b) Students will write an essay describing the various types of indigenous Ugandan building basing themselves on their observations in the museum.
- (c) Students will be able to answer history questions in class by drawing back on their experience in the museum.

The curriculum developer must be cautioned about one major difficulty to be faced about objectives suggested by specialists. Such objectives often tend to be too technical or too academic and specialized; as such they are often inappropriate for the majority of school pupils, especially in most African countries where less than 5% of the secondary school leavers find places at the university. The basic cause of this difficulty is that specialists are often asked the wrong question which runs more or less like this: "What kind of instruction should secondary school students who intend to do more advanced work in your field be subjected to?" The most appropriate questions should be something like this: "What can your subject contribute to the education of your people who are not going to be specialists in the field? What can your subject contribute to the common man or the average variety of citizen? What can your subject contribute to the education of young people who will not specialize in it?" Armed with such proper questions even an ordinary practising history teacher can individually carry out some valuable consultations with trained historians and greatly improve his teaching.

CONCLUSION:

The purpose of this paper was to explicate subject matter as a source of educational goals and instructional objectives in order to encourage practising

teachers and curricular developers in East Africa to improve the quality of their curricula, particularly in the field of history. It was not intended to add to the already familiar outcry of educationists for elaborate national commissions, committees and seminars for establishing educational goals. It cannot be denied, however, that subject matter can most effectively suggest educational goals when examined by well organised curricular organs such as those advocated by various scholars and educators in the 1960's in East Africa.

Four essential points were made in the paper. First it was suggested that subject matter was one of the three main data sources for educational and instructional objectives according to the Tyler Rationale. Most objectives attempted in schools and colleges are derived from this data source. A specialist or group of specialists are crucial in generating objectives from subject matter in their particular field in an attempt to satisfactorily answer the following question:

"What can your subject contribute to the education of your people who are not going to be specialists in the field; what can your subject contribute to the common man or the average variety of citizen?"

Finally the writer hopes that the brief discussion and illustration in this paper will provoke more constructive thought and action on the part of history specialists and education practitioners about the process of deriving educational and instructional objectives from history.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Educational Goals*

These are the kinds of changes in behaviour that an educational Institution seeks to bring about in its students. They are the ends of learning, and they are composed of two parts, namely the content and the behavioural part.

Instructional Objectives

These are the ends of instruction, that is the types of changed in behaviour that a particular phase of instruction attempts to bring about in its students. These objectives are normally stated precisely, in terms of measurable or observable learner behaviour.

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6. J. Burckhardt. *Judgements on History and Historians* (1959) p. 158.
7. A. L. Rowse. *The Use of History*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1946 p. 179.
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9. Francis Bacon quoted in A. L. Rowse *op. cit.* p. 179.
10. H. A. L. Fisher quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 19-20.
11. G. W. F. Hegel quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 29.
12. Sir George Clark quoted in E. H. Carr. *What is History?* London: Macmillan 1961 p. 5.

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CONCERNING FREEDOM: AN EXISTENTIAL CRITIQUE OF MAN AND SOCIETY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

MASHAKA C. P. ONIANG'O*

Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism might be understood as the cradle of his conceptual analysis of not only human reality and morality, but also the individual and society. The historical base of his philosophy is not unrelated to events such as: the humiliating defeat which Paris suffered at the hands of the German Army an event which was punctuated by the German Occupation, and Sartre himself was imprisoned by the Germans and set free only because of his continually failing eyesight.

I might also add that Sartre's existential account of human reality and human reaction is vividly revealed in his play, *The Flies*,** which was published and presented in 1943. In this play, Sartre reminds us that once the Germans had taken over Paris, many of its citizens had found it easier to surrender to the Occupation rather than to fight back for their city, and their right to rule themselves. Even the moral support was lacking. The Catholic Church, for instance, had urged that the Occupation of Paris was a just consequence for the moral transgressions and religious disrespect that had overcome the Paris citizens before the war, and now they were reaping the fruits of their sins. We should also keep in mind that there were various French factions in Paris; those who supported the German Occupation, those who neither consented to the German Occupation nor rose up against it, and those who like Sartre, became members of the Resistance, holding that the German Occupation of Paris was not only an overt injustice to the citizens of Paris, but even more crucial, it was serious injustice for the citizens themselves to yield to and be intimidated by the German Occupation. In this regard, Sartre is attacking his fellow Parisians who actively supported or passively allowed the injustice of the German Occupation to continue to

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**See Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Flies*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1946). In this play, Sartre's main theme of freedom as meaning the freedom of man's will to act cannot be over-emphasized. For Sartre, freedom must not be confused with the total ability to act in any manner so desired. Action must be looked upon to letting something happen to you. One's freedom is going to be limited. This is part of the burden of being human, but there is a great difference between the natural limitation that life places upon us and those limitations that we place and institute upon ourselves. To be free is not to be able to do what one likes; it is to will what one can do. For Sartre, freedom is not viewed as a potentiality for infinite actions, but rather as human condition, or if you will, the human condition. It is that from which man's existence has value and places values upon the world.

exist. This is a political critique of men of his society . . . a critique by which Sartre evokes serious questions of personal values and political responsibility of not only the Parisians, but indeed, of all human beings.

Sartre's criticism against his fellow Parisians is geared toward the pursuit of human dignity that the Parisians have lost as a result of the German Occupation and their yielding to the Occupation. This is an attempt to make a plea not only to the Parisians, but also to all human beings to take note of the political conditions of their country and to act upon the right to be free and have the human dignity that all men deserve and must have if their existence is to have any value.

I will attempt to analyse Sartre's concept of freedom and show that it is a universally relevant plea to all "occupied" people throughout the world. This applies to the continued illegitimate Occupation of the new military regime of Portugal in Africa, it should strengthen the Zimbabwe majority occupied by a handful of racist Europeans, it is a worthwhile food of thought for the majority Africans in Azania whose minds have been maimed by the fascist philosophy of apartheid, and the list can go on and on to include the black-masked neo-colonialists in Africa. Hopefully, this analysis of Sartre's positive criticism on his people will serve as constructive critique of my fellow Africans who actively support or passively allow the injustice of both the European as well as black-masked neo-colonialist Occupation to continue to exist on our land. This analogy is relevant to the American Indian who now languishes on reservations, the Afro-American to whom the U.S. should be as much his land as it is the White American's, the Aborigine of Australia, the Palestinian, the Irish, the Puerto Ricans, and many African countries whose leaders are so obsessed with tribalism and nepotism that they have illegitimately occupied the rest. These people suffer the injustices of illegitimate Occupation. It is their duty not only to recognize that they are unfree, but also to liberate themselves. For Sartre, these Occupied people must *will* their freedom to be authentic and dignified.

Having shared a brief exposition of the historical setting of the Sartrean Existentialist Philosophy thus far, perhaps I should pause for a close examination of his underlying ideas.

Sartre sees freedom and consciousness as ultimately two indistinguishable aspects of human reality and existential being. Man is free due to his consciousness, and in turn, it is man's consciousness that separates him from the other creatures in the world in the sense that unlike the other creatures, man is his freedom. But Sartre argues that although man is free, his freedom is not a gift. It is a curse which is also the only source of human greatness.¹

For Sartre, freedom is the burden of human being in the sense that because man is free, he is also responsible for his freedom, and hence responsible for not only what he is but also what he is not. But how does man become free? Sartre's answer to this question would be that man is

born free, and without any excuses; from the moment of his birth to the moment of his death he is condemned to be free.² I might infer, therefore, that man does not become free, but rather freedom is the burden of his being born. Freedom is an inescapable sentence from which neither man himself nor anybody else is capable of pardoning him.

Now I shall turn to the fundamental duality of being in which Sartre claims that freedom is rooted; namely: *being-in-itself* and *being-for-itself*. The former refers to the self-contained being of things, herein the being as well as essence of such "things" are one and the same. This means that being-in-itself simply *is* that which it must be; a spear *is* a spear, a shield *is* a shield, a mountain *is* a mountain. On the other hand, being-for-itself is not self-contained and can never be self-contained; rather, it is co-extensive with human consciousness. Rather than simply being what it must be, being for itself is continuously characterized by Sartre as being that which it is not, namely a thing. In the Sartrean view, being-for-itself differs from being-in-itself by the fact that the former is contingent upon the latter for its being. Furthermore, Sartre holds that the for-itself is synonymous with human being or consciousness, and that it is precisely because human being is distinct from the being of things (being-in-themselves) that man as being-for-itself is free.

To being of other things in the world such as: a spear, a shield, a mountain and so forth must be distinguished from human being which by virtue of its freedom and ability, it is capable of becoming something other than what it is. In other words, human being inherently has the constant potentiality within itself to become something greater than it presently is, and thereby further develop towards the Essence which lacks total Being. I might clarify this view by adding that human being is then not distinguished from other beings in the world merely by virtue of its potentiality for change,³ but rather by the fact that it has the ability to change itself, and this ability is inherent within the very nature (essence) of human existence. Furthermore, whereas other beings in the world have a pre-established Essence, human being lacks it.

What does Sartre really mean when he asserts that human beings can be distinguished from other beings in the world by their lack of a pre-established Essence? In what sense can one legitimately make the claim that man is *essentially* free and at the same time lacks an Essence without one contradicting himself? The Sartrean *modus videndi* to this apparent puzzle lies in the difference between nature as an existing human being (essence) and man's ability to create from his freedom (essence) the Being (essence) that he is constantly choosing to become. In other words, man as a human being, has an essence which distinguishes him from the other beings (things) in the world, namely his freedom to become that which he intends himself to become. Furthermore, man has the freedom to become what he chooses to become because he lacks a pre-established Essence. In this regard, the

Sartrean view seems to make sense because if we suppose for one moment that man's Essence were already established, then he would not be free to create his Essence, and would, most probably, simply be another thing (in itself) in the world. This seems to be the basis for Sartre's conclusion that there is a fundamental distinction between the essence of man as a human being and the Essence that each man lacks and is continually creating until his death.

By its very nature, consciousness is always beyond itself intending and directing man towards his Essence. Through his consciousness man intends what he is to be. Each intentional act adds to what he will Essentially become; each intentional act further defines that Being that he is to become. Because he is essentially free, each man has the responsibility of developing his Essence, which he does by the constant intentional projection of himself upon the world and others. In this way each individual is continually creating the Essence that he is to become. Hence, while man *is*, in the sense that he exists in the world as a human being, his Essence is continually characterized by the fact that he is not. This is what Sartre means when he asserts that man's existence precedes his Essence.⁴ "It means that, first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, (this is his essence), and only afterwards, defines (intends) himself (his Essence.)"⁵ Consciousness is not only a necessary condition of human being, but it is also that which gives man his freedom (Essence) to be and the ability to become (Essence). Because man lacks a pre-established Essence, he can and must create his Essence. "Man is nothing but what he makes of himself. Such is the first principle of Existentialism."⁶

Sartre makes the assertion that man's freedom is meaningful only if it is practical. In his view, existentialism and indeed human existence itself can only be looked upon as a metaphysical joke if freedom is not practical. Freedom and consciousness together create an ability for action, and unless one can intentionally *act* upon his freedom in a self-directed and meaningful way, he cannot be said to *have* freedom. "There is no reality, except in action."⁷

Let me quickly define authentic and inauthentic actions. For Sartre, only those acts which are self-directed and intentional are to be considered authentic; but those acts which are not self-directed and self-originated, but instead, arise from the wants and demands of another are to be considered inauthentic. Sartre calls those acts originating from an individual's freedom and values "acts of good faith"; while those originating solely from the desires and values of another he calls "acts of bad faith".

For Sartre, man's freedom is practical. Because man's freedom is practical he can either use it to assert his being upon the world or conversely prostitute his being by becoming the servant of the other. Man's freedom can either make him the master of his potentiality for being that which he is not, or it can make him a slave to the will and wants of the other by denying his freedom and in turn becoming what the other would have him be. But in

either case he is responsible for the act of choosing, though he may choose to let the other choose his actions for him. Freedom then becomes meaningful and defined not in one's words or thoughts, but in one's actions and deeds.

To be free then, is to have the ability to intend one's actions and at the same to have the ability to act upon one's intentions. Man becomes that which he is not (his Essence) by acting upon that which he is (his freedom and essence). But to act without a plan, that is, to act without intention is as meaningless as acting purely from the desires and wants of another. In other words, freedom to act is empty and meaningless unless at the same time one is consciously considering and intending his being through his actions *and* accepting the responsibility for those actions as a genuine reflection of his being-to-become, that is, as the Essence he is intending to become. Man only becomes his freedom when he becomes totally responsible for the instigation of his acts, for then and only then can he be said to be totally responsible and totally committed to his being. Anything less than such a total commitment must be considered hypocritical. Only when one becomes absolutely committed to his acts, can he be said to be absolutely free, that is, absolutely his essence to become.

Although man is ontologically absolutely free to develop and create his Essence, in the sense that no other can choose it for him, for even if he has the other makes his choices for him, he has nevertheless chosen to have him choose for him. I might point out at this juncture, however, that man is not absolutely free in the sense that his real choices are limited by not only the world, but also his previous choices and present situation. Although one is "absolutely" free to choose, one might argue that his choices are limited. Just as the world imposes real limitations on man's freedom and choices, so does the presence of other human beings. Man is "absolutely" free in that he must choose what he is to become, but what he can choose and, therefore, become is restricted by the real limitations on man's freedom and choices, so does the presence of other human beings. Man is "absolutely" free in that he must choose what he is to become, but what he can choose and, therefore because, is restricted by the real limitations that are imposed upon him by the world, other human beings, his past history, and himself. All these influence man's real ability to choose.

An individual who freely and intentionally acts upon his being does so not only for himself, but for all men. In choosing his freedom and actions, he is responsible to himself for creating his being and responsible to all others for their freedom to become; for "in choosing myself, I choose man",⁸ that is, in choosing myself, I choose the right for all men to choose and create their values and act upon their freedom. If my freedom and commitment is to be absolute, then my choice will necessarily be a choice for all men. Man lives in a world which is comprised of other men and as such the other becomes a condition of his being and freedom. Man does not exist in the world by himself, but exists in a situation, which among

other things is comprised of other human beings. Part of man's "facticity" is that he exists in the world with others. Therefore, any appraisal that he makes of his situation is necessarily going to involve at least two considerations of the other beings present: that the others exist and view me as another to help them; and second, that in acting upon the others, I am presenting them with my values, as they presented me with theirs, in the original appraisal of the situation. The others constitute a condition of my freedom in that they are the ones that I act upon, express my values to, and at the same time (they) recognize my actions and give them (actions) significance. It is because the others exist that I can and must be responsible for my actions, for without the others there could be no responsibility for one's actions because there would be nobody to be responsible to.

Freedom has meaning precisely because there are others to give its meaning. "... he perceives them (others) as a condition of his own existence. He recognizes that he cannot be anything, unless the other recognizes him as such."⁹ Man's nature is to be free, but others provide a condition for his freedom; this "condition" is the responsibility and commitment that makes freedom meaningful and gives it a personal value.

The existence of the other people creates a condition and possibility for man's freedom and being to be meaningful. It will be remembered that for Sartre freedom is only meaningful when and only when it becomes practical, that is, when acted upon. In other words, only through one's deeds can one be said to be truly creating his Being. Human being is possible because man's Essence is not yet all that it has potentiality to become. Freedom and consciousness are then intimately connected with a third condition of human being, the negation of man's being or if you will, the nothingness or lack of "thingness" in a world of things. Freedom occurs because man is not a being-in-itself, but rather a being-for-itself. This is for Sartre the very essence of man's possibility to create his Being. Man is free because he is nothing and nothing because he is free. He exists as a free being because he lacks a pre-established Essence. One might say that man *is* because he is not.

At first, this might appear to be a paradox, but in actual fact it is a paradox of words only. We might say that since man exists, he is, of course, not absolutely nothing. Man as he exists does have being and essence, but since the nature of his essence is that it has not-yet-become all that it can be, man is in this sense nothing, because part of being a "thing" is having a pre-established Essence, that is, not having any potentiality to become anything other than it is. Man is (has essence and being), but is not, in the sense that lacks Essence and still has the potentiality to become more than he presently is. Hence Sartre asserts that man has the potentiality to become something because he is nothing. The distinction then is between things which lack the possibility to be other than they are, and therefore, have their Essence identical to their existence, and human beings who lack

such an identity, and therefore, are to be considered nothing. But as I have mentioned above, it is because they lack Essence that it is possible for man to create his Being from his being and essence.

To say that man *is* because he is nothing is not to say that his existence lacks meaning and purpose. Indeed man's nothingness is the very condition of his essence, which is to create his Essence. It is exactly for that reason that man is nothing that he has the possibility to create his Being, to intend his Essence and to approach his potentiality for Being. Ultimately, however, he can never fully transcend his being to become a thing-in-itself. I might, therefore, add that another constituent of man's being is his finitude. Though man is constantly free to become that which he is not, the actual possibility of him becoming all his possibilities is forever beyond his nature; for if it were possible that he could reach a unity of his potentiality and actuality, so that he become one with his Essence, he would no longer be a man but a thing.¹⁰ Even those who try to become a thing in the world by letting the other choose for them fail, for only at death is this unity actualized. Man is forever condemned to the fact that he can never fully become all his possibilities. Only upon death is man's complete potentiality realized and finalized. In his own words, Sartre tells us "I am my possibility only through the nihilition (negation) of being-in-itself which I have to be, death as the inhilation of the nihilition is the positing of my being as in-itself".¹¹

Death establishes man's Being in that it ends his further possibility to be. Freedom originates with birth,¹² and ends with death. The absurd climax to being, makes imperative that man choose those projects which will maximize his possibilities.

Freedom then is for Sartre not to be viewed as an abstract concept, but rather is to be viewed as a concrete definitive characteristic of human being and human reality. Man *is* only because he is free to become that which he is not. Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of the human being is suspended in his freedom. What we call freedom is impossible to be distinguished from what we call human reality; ... there is no difference between the being of man and his being free.¹³ How interesting that for Shakespeare's Hamlet, existence and essence were a matter of "to be *or* not to be," but for Sartre man's essence and his freedom exist in the fact that man's being is "to be *and* not-to-be". For while man *is* in the sense that he exists, that is, has being and essence, he is not in the sense that he has not yet become his Essence. Man is free only because his being is such that it has not yet Become. Each man is responsible for his being is such that it has not yet Become. Each man is responsible for and author their true intentions and goals. But at the same time he is responsible for the freedom of others in the same way that they are responsible for the meaning of his freedom and its value as a means of expressing himself in the world.

Human existence as presented in *The Flies* is then for Sartre not

absolutely with value; rather being a human being has its own value and this value partially transcends the gap between the individual and the other. The answer to how can I act in good faith upon my values and freedom if I take the values of the other into consideration as a criterion for my action upon the other, is that the other's human dignity is part of my human dignity, and that to act "with human dignity" is to act in good faith upon the other, not as merely another object in the world but as another human being who has the same "right" to human dignity as do I.

Although we must remember that Sartre's play *The Flies* was written for the citizens of Paris (Sartre is telling the Parisians that they have lost their human dignity), indeed the message is universally applicable today in its own right as a plea to any people who have been overrun, enslaved, humiliated, and occupied by a tyrannical government, to fight for their right to human dignity and to rid themselves of the oppression of the illegitimate Occupation. For the Parisians, it is a plea to rid themselves of the inhumane oppression of the German Occupation. For us Africans, it is a serious plea to rid ourselves of first the Colonialist Occupation of the racist and tyrannical regimes in Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. In other words, we should not rest until every African can walk the streets in the Southern Africa a free man. Second, it is a plea that we Africans should take seriously to rid ourselves of the Neo-Colonialist Occupation which is both symptomatic of and concomitant with the Foreign Economic Occupation in our so-called Independent Africa. In Sartrean view, all human beings have the right to live and act with human dignity, and that anyone who would rob another of this right is acting in bad faith in that they are denying themselves and the other of the basic value of human existence. For Sartre, to enslave the other is to enslave one's self to the other; to rob the other of his freedom is to rob one's self of one's own freedom; and to believe that one can rule over the other and yet not be acting in bad faith is to deceive one's self by the very fact of bad faith. The authentic man (man of good faith) acts upon the other as a human being, not as an object which either can be enslaved or be the source of one's values or the master of one's freedom and responsibilities.

This aspect of Sartre's Existentialism has often gone unnoticed or if noticed has been ignored. The other has value in the same manner that my existence has value, namely, as a human being. Man exists, free and independent of any other, and yet part of the facticity of his existence is that he exists in the world with others. In acting upon the other I can either act with human dignity, that is, act in good faith, or I can act without human dignity, that is, act in bad faith. In either case my acting upon the other expresses my values to the other in the same way that his acting upon my presence expresses "his" values and denying the human dignity of both myself and the other. In view of the Sartrean Existentialism, our fascist "friends" who still engage in human story and will not go unnoticed. For them

to deny our rights and freedom to choose our Essence, is to deny us the human dignity that they desire for themselves and, therefore, to deny *themselves* the dignity that accompanies human being.

The full content of what "human dignity" is might be grasped through analysis of President Mobutu's philosophical defence upon reclaiming his authentic name:

*What does it mean? I no longer have a borrowed soul. I no longer speak in a borrowed language. My manner of speaking is authentically Zaireois. A Zeireois soul inhabits my body. I am first of all Zaireois before anything else.*¹⁴

Human dignity never denies the right of the other to act upon his freedom or to create his Essence, nor does it deny the individual's responsibility for his Being.

Human dignity also entails positive Political Philosophy. The Chief of State of Ghana, Ignatius K. Acheampong whose policy embraces the former type of philosophy had this to say before foreign diplomats in Accra:

Total emancipation of Africa from colonial domination will continue to be the cardinal principle of Ghana's foreign policy. Accordingly, we will give support, both moral and material, to independence movements in Africa.¹⁵

As such, human dignity is the value of human being, of being able to choose one's Essence and act upon the other as an authentic, value-creating being. It is the sense of pride that one can take in the creating of his Being and in acting in good faith; it is the sense of pride that one gets from standing in an authentic relationship with the other and treating the other not merely as an object in the world, but as another human being. As Sartre puts it, "nothing can be good for us, without being good for all".¹⁶

1. Maxwell Aldereth, *Commitment in Modern French Literature*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), p. 159.
2. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Human Emotions* (New York: The Wisdom Library, 1957), p. 23.
3. For Sartre, "potentiality" for change that every human being possesses is not supposed to be thought of in the Aristotelian sense of "potentiality". Sartre holds that it is because human being is nothing that it is free to develop an Essence and strive to become what it is not. He would, therefore, argue that human being, as such, is nothing, and hence lacks any potentiality of the Aristotelian sense. But does it really make any sense to say that there is human being, which is nothing, and yet it is at the same time capable to making choices and striving to become something without using the Aristotelian notion of "potentiality?" What a big confusion the Sartrean view of "potentiality" seems to hold!
4. Sartre, *Existentialism*, p. 13
5. *Ibid*, p. 15.
6. *Ibid*.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
10. This clearly shows that Sartre's use of man's potentiality differs from that of Aristotle's as follows: whereas for Aristotle man developed his potentialities because of an inherent ability found within the nature of man itself, for Sartre, man has the potentiality or rather the possibility to create an Essence, because he is inherently nothing, and therefore, free to develop or create his potentialities. One might even go so far as to say that man does not have any potentiality, in that he is forever creating his potentiality; in this sense man is mere act, and is always in quest of his potentiality. But still, Sartre has failed to enlighten us as to what it is that strives to become those potentialities. Secondly, his view by which he asserts that man is nothing without any potentialities and yet is a being who is continually striving to become that which he is not and lacks any inherent potentiality to do so, does not seem to make sense at all.
11. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1953), p. 691.
12. It is questionable whether Sartre means that man is literally *born* with his freedom or whether he means that man is born with the potentiality to be free. I shall expatriate on this criticism later in my paper.
13. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 60.
14. San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle, 25th June, 1972.
15. The Washington Post, January 18th, 1972.
16. Sartre, *Existentialism*, p. 17.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF ABAISENGOBI RULE IN SOUTHERN KIGULU*

RENEE TANTALA

To describe the abaiseNgobi¹ in terms of charismatic leadership and a prestigious cultural tradition does not really explain how abaiseNgobi hegemony was achieved over most of northern Busoga. The aim of this article is a better understanding of the consolidation of abaiseNgobi rule by examining, within a particular polity, social and economic factors affecting political integration.²

The late seventeenth century Mukama migration through central Busoga initiated the development of a cultural frontier between northern and southern Busoga. In the pre-abaiseNgobi era the communities of Southern Kigulu County were culturally continuous with those of southern Busoga. Religious, economic, and social contacts with the south persisted even though abaiseNgobi hegemony introduced some new social and political ideas. The abaiseNgobi themselves took a keen interest in the southern neighbours. Migration into northern Busoga from the south accelerated in the nineteenth century due to increasing population pressure, the military expeditions of the Ganda, and better opportunities in the northern states. As a result cultural differences were gradually eroded. People moving north in search of land and opportunities often stopped over for some time in border villages such as those of southern Kigulu County where they might have clansmen or might still maintain ties with clansmen in villages directly to the south. That the residents of southern Kigulu County participated in two increasingly overlapping cultural zones needs to be taken into consideration in any study of their traditions.

By the mid-nineteenth century the abaiseNgobi expansion in Kigulu had resulted in at least eight polities. Present-day Kigulu County corresponds closely to the territory of these polities plus the territory of Busambira, whose ruling family intermarried with the abaiseNgobi. Ngobi Kikere, ruler of Buzimba in the 1890s, united them and called the new polity Kigulu after the name of a hill significant in clan history. Kigulu also serves as a convenient collective terms for the total area of these polities before their unification. Southern Kigulu refers to the abaiseNgobi polity in the south-western corner of the modern County, directly to the west of Busambira. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century Gonza Bato (c. 1936-1884),³ an able and ambitious prince, gained control of the abaiseNgobi

* Kigulu is in North Busoga, in the East of Uganda.

base in Ighawu from where he established effective rule over the rest of Southern Kigulu. Prior to this the abaiseNgobi had ruled only small portion of the territory. In the last half of the nineteenth century Southern Kigulu included the present villages of Ighawu, where Gonza Bato had his *mbuga* or headquarters, Namasoga, Busu, and Nawansinge. The pre-colonial name for this polity appears to have been 'Bugabula' but there are two reasons for this usage: to prevent confusion with the state of Bugabula in the northwest corner of Busoga; because in some instances 'Bugabula' refers to Ighawu rather than to the polity itself.

In Southern Kigulu the abaiseNgobi had to compete with strong royalties at the level of the village community, a relatively self-sufficient unit. The available evidence indicates that in the pre-abaiseNgobi era the inhabitants of southern Kigulu County lived in several *mitala* (villages) organized under the leadership of clans with religious prestige. Whether or not these villages were previously part of any larger polity, for example, Busambira, is an open question. Gonza Bato's polity, however, was certainly a new arrangement. He needed to foster among his people a sense of identity, a feeling that as his subjects they belonged to the larger community based on his polity. Although he did establish a viable political system, he was not completely successful in overcoming localized loyalties. In some aspects of the everyday life of the ordinary people the village community remained more significant than the polity. The consolidation of abaiseNgobi rule resulted from the ways in which new and old residents were brought into the system, yet a fuller understanding of that system emerges from an analysis of the relative importance of the village community and of the polity in the lives of the people.

The communities in what became Southern Kigulu may have had some contact with the abaiseNgobi entourage when Ibanda Ngobi (1737 $\pm$ 37), the founder of the ruling house of Buzimba, was growing up at Nhenda Hill or even later when he had his own enclosure at Kigulu Hill. During the time of Lugwiri (the son of IbandaNgobi, 1764 $\pm$ 34) the abaiseNgobi center shifted to the northern part of Kigulu County. Presumably Busambira remained the established polity in the south until the abaiseNgobi turned their ambitions southward again in the early years of the nineteenth century.

According to tradition Kiregeya was the first mwiseNgobi prince to establish a *mbuga* in Ighawu, probably in the 1820's since he assumed the Ngobishop of Buzimba C.1830. While in Ighawu Kiregeya cast his eyes covetously in the direction of Nawansinge. He informed Bagoole, the mwiseNkwalu chief of that *mutala*, that he wished to marry his daughter. Unfortunately for Kiregeya, Bagoole foresaw the consequences and refused this insidious offer. Greatly annoyed, Kiregeya promptly sent a party of men to kill him. Although the abaiseNkwalu fled at this point, the people of Nawansinge still managed to put up a strong resistance. Perhaps the abaiseIgaga who became the guardians of the abaiseNkwalu *musambwa*

shrine provided some leadership. In any case feuding continued across the Walutente stream until Kiregeya and his followers admitted that the determination of the people of Nawansinge was too much for them.

When Kiregeya became Ngobi, his younger brother Nkobe replaced him in Ighawu. Nkobe ruled there only a few years until he himself succeeded to the throne of Buzimba C.1836. Ngobi Nkobe is best remembered for the successful defensive wars which he fought against Luuka. Such a warrior needed many *abazira* (brave men). In the first quarter of the nineteenth century a large and prominent abaiseMuhaya family from Bugweri sought refuge in Southern Kigulu. Some of the men became the *abazira* of the abaiseNgobi and, as customary for an immigrant group, gave some women to the abaiseNgobi to be their wives. Nkobe married Mukise a mwiseMuhaya girl from Nawansinge. Their son Obo, later known as Gonza Bato, eventually brought that proud *mutala* into the abaiseNgobi orbit.

No mwiseNgobi prince was allowed to rule before reaching adulthood, that is, his early twenties. As Gonza Bato was growing up, political authority remained in the hand of Nkobe, his clients, and his elder sons. While it is difficult to determine exactly how Gonza Bato came to replace his father Ighawu (either when his father became the Ngobi or sometime in the next ten years or so), the baiseMuhaya undoubtedly did as much as possible to promote the fortunes of the young prince. Famous *abazira* and by now one of the numerically dominant clans in Nawansinge they were certainly capable of doing so. However, Nawansinge could not have served as Gonza Bato's base of operations—since Kiregeya's murder of Bagoole no prince had been allowed to sleep even one night in Nawansinge. Presumably he grew up in one of a *bisoko* (sub-villages) of Ighawu from where, with the support of the abaiseMuhaya *abazira* and probably some abaiseMagumba, he managed to succeed his father.⁴ He then rewarded his mwiseMagumba friend Kagolo with the position of 'Katikiro' and his mwiseMuhaya relative Lundhaya with the position of Kalabalaba.

In 1840s Gonza Bato participated in the same series of battles against Luuka which were being fought by Ngobi Ngobe. Having dealt successfully with this external threat, Gonza Bato must have been in a strong position: he had gained some practical experience for himself, he had a string of proven *abazira*, and he probably had added some *bisoko* to Ighawu. Then events at the abaiseNgobi centre interrupted his local career.

For more than a decade (C.1850 to 1862) after the reign of Ngobi Nkobe, Kigulu experienced considerable political instability. Several sons of Nkobe ruled, but none of them for more than a few years. Kibikibi (C.1850-C.1855), his immediate and most successful successor, enjoyed the nominal loyalty of the local princes at the beginning of his reign, but there were too many ambitious men among them for their support to last. Gonza Bato is said to have been Kibikibi's successor. This is corroborated

by another source which includes Gabula, another of Gonza Bato's nicknames, among the sons of Nkobe who succeeded him. Although Gonza Bato took an active role in the succession disputes, even claiming the throne for a short time, he is not included in the 'official' list of the rulers of Buzimba.⁵ Presumably he had not gone through the customary accession ceremonies. The other princes considered him as an usurper, threw him out, and sent him back to Southern Kigulu. From this incident comes the saying, 'Kalenzi genda abaghala bakuloby'e' which means 'Go away small boy, the girls have refused you.'

Ngobi Kiwe (also called Kiwayo), Kibikibi's formal successor, refused to give back to Gonza Bato what he and his abaiseMuhaya relatives considered his rightful territory. Evidently, he either tried to prevent Gonza Bato's return to Southern Kigulu or attempted to replace him with another prince. The abaiseMuhaya claim to have collected their clansmen from as far as Budiopo and marched to the Kabaka. They returned to depose Kiwe, sharing the plunder with the Kabaka's men. This provided an example for any other Ngobi who might want to depose Gonza Bato, but in fact Kiwe's successors were too weak to even attempt it. During the remaining years of confusion before the reign of Walusansa (C.1862), Gonza Bato re-established his position in Southern Kigulu.

Apparently he realized that Walusansa was capable of bringing stability to Kigulu and that it would be advantageous to support such a strong prince. Ngobi Walusansa did depose several other princes, but it is even claimed that he entrusted their villages to the care of Gonza Bato until he could appoint his own men. From time to time Gonza Bato sent some men to work on Kalusansa's enclosure. In his own domain he remained autonomous until his death sometime between 1879 and 1884. He was succeeded by his son Katekalusi who inherited a political tradition as well as a seat of power.

Now the discussion can turn to the strengths and weaknesses of that administrative system and to the factors complicating the consolidation of abaiseNgobi rule.

In *Bantu Bureaucracy* Lloyd Fallers remarks on the spatial stability of the Soga village.⁶ The available evidence confirms this in the case of Nawansinge, but suggests that Ighawu is an exception. Evidently, Gonza Bato created Ighawu (as it is known today) by adding to it other *mitala*. In pre-colonial times the villages of Southern Kigulu were divided into administrative units called *bisoko* (sing. *kisoko*) just as they are today, but the divisions were not the same as the present ones. Nawansinge had only two *bisoko* in the pre-colonial era, but the late nineteenth century Ighawu had at least ten *bisoko*. That Ighawu may represent an agglomeration of earlier *mitala* is subtly suggested by the way in which its residents are identified. When a resident of Ighawu is mentioned in an interview

or in conversation, he is usually referred to as a resident of a particular *kisoko*. Such references are rarely made for residents of the other *mitala*.

In addition to the pattern of hill-top communities there is a close correlation between the drainage pattern of northern Busoga and the boundaries between the polities. The villages ruled by Gonza formed a natural unit bound by the Lumbuye River in the west, the Kasanga tributary in the south, the Nabutundwe tributary in the north and the Walugogo River in the east. Some local informants claim that he once held the village of Budwege. This is plausible since no swamp or deep valley separates Budwege from Ighawu. The same geography applies to the *mutala* of Buwayo which Gonza Bato and the mwaseNgobi ruler of Bukoyo did divide between themselves in the 1870s. On the other hand, the stream Walutente to the west of the Walugogo helped to separate Nawasinge from Ighawu, contributing to the independent attitude of the resident of Nawasinge.

Geographical features also support the claim that Ighawu's *bisoko* of Ntinda and Masaba were once *mitala*. Masaba forms the distinct section between the streams Masaba and Nkabale. That Ntinda is almost cut off from Ighawu by Namasoga and Busu invites speculation. Since the abaiseNgobi headquarters were traditionally in Ntinda and since Ighawu is also the name of *kisoko*, Ighawu may have been a *mutala* which was taken over and which then gave its name to the larger unit. In view of the reliability of the informants who have made these specific claims, the more general descriptions of Gonza Bato's expansionist activities given by other informants, and the evidence relating to the takeover of Buwoya, it is highly unlikely that Ighawu was a stable unit in the nineteenth century. There is no reason why political changes could not lead to changing territorial designations when this was geographically feasible.

The problem of whether or not some of the *bisoko* of pre-colonial Ighawu were formerly *mitala* is significant in terms of the pre-abaiseNgobi heritage. The incoming abaiseNgobi, if confronted with even loosely organized communities, not only upset the existing political order, but compounded the loyalties of the people. Why did a village such as Nawasinge preserve its distinctiveness while the identity of others, even though they became *bisoko*, was not totally submerged? Whatever the advantages of accepting or submitting to abaiseNgobi rule, at least in some aspects of everyday life, the *mutala* remained more important than any larger unit of community such as a group of villages under the common rule of a prince. Thus, certain continuities from the earlier period are important factors contributing to working against any attempted political integration. These factors emerge from the history of each *mutala*, but information on the pre-abaiseNgobi era is difficult to obtain.

The earlier settlements in Busoga, according to tradition, were along the shore of Lake Victoria. Throughout the pre-colonial period the communities of southern Busoga were oriented towards the Lake, but clan

histories reveal a continuous trickle of migrants northwards. Southern Kigulu County may have been affected by the Kintu migration (1250 A.D. $\pm$ 150), but no specific evidence has been retrieved relating that migration to this area. What is certain, however, is that there were communities in southern Kigulu County prior to the migration of Mukama and his entourage through central Busoga, that is, before the end of the seventeenth century. These communities also looked towards the south, for trade and wives. The interior of Busoga remained sparsely populated until the eighteenth century.

Important for the political development of the area were the abaise-Igaga communities clustered around Nhenda Hill in southeasteast Kigulu County. Apparently the abaiseIgaga had established themselves here a short time before the Mukama migration. It is possible that their territory once extended westwards from the present Busambira. The descendants of the abaiseIgaga rulers assert that their polity lost territory not only to Kigulu, but also to Bugweri and to Bunya. Buima and other states to the south may have had some political influence as well.

Originally the communities of southern Kigulu County were self-sufficient in the religious sphere. The available evidence strongly suggests that they were organized under the leadership of clans with religious prestige. The *misambwa* cults, then, constitute the most significant aspect of the pre-abaiseNgobi heritage.

Sometime before the eighteenth century the abaiseNkwalu, a clan with origins near Lake Victoria, migrated and established centre at Magada a few miles southwest of Nhenda Hills. From there they dispersed and came to Nawansinge where they were the original owners, as far as can be determined, of the *musambwa* shrine called Nawansinge. At some point they took up the chieftainship. When the abaiseNgobi murdered the mwise-Nkwalu *mutala* chief of Nawansinge, the abaiseNkwalu fled, but the abaiseNgobi did not become the owners of the *musambwa*. Nawansinge's resistance undoubtedly stemmed from a sense of identity as the people of Nawansinge, that is, as the people of the *musambwa*. The abaiseIgaga assumed responsibility for the shrine and the religious tradition continued.

Nawansinge *musambwa* was available to all the people and the requests—successful journeys, fertility, rain in time of drought—included their most vitally felt concerns. Sometimes the entire village would come together to petition the *musambwa*:

Then the one who was going to pray would kneel down and say, 'Nawansinge, stop punishing your people, give them food so they won't suffer.' Then he gets coffee berries and throws them in the tree, slaughters the chickens, and the people eat that chicken. Then he would say, "Nawansinge, we have given you things, give us freedom and children so that we can live in peace without fighting." After that the owner of the *musambwa* would kill a cow for the people

to celebrate and to thank Nawansinge for giving in the name of Nawansinge. Everyone in the village could come and cut as much of that meat as he wanted—no one could stop him.⁷

This suggests how their identity developed and why it persisted. Newcomers during the nineteenth century brought their *misambwa* with them but these cults closely linked to their particular families, never acquired so much prestige. Nawansinge continued to be the village *musambwa*.

As for the other villages the traditions indicate that the incoming abaiseNgobi appropriated for themselves some of the shrines which they found. If the clans associated with the shrines had political as well as religious prestige, this represents one aspect of their political ascendancy. In Ntinda, Masaba, Ighawu *kisoko*, Busu, and Namasoga, there were *misambwa*, resembling Nawansinge, which were very likely the foci of pre-abaiseNgobi communities. After the abaiseNgobi took them over, they were thought to be acting for their new owners. Nevertheless, some influence remained with the original owners since the abaiseNgobi could approach them only through their respective *bataka*, the holders of ancient clan land.

Some shrines remained in the hands of the indigenous clans while others arrived with immigrant families. That *misambwa* usually travelled with their clans illustrates their importance in the religious system. The *musambwa* Meru, brought to Ighawu in the early nineteenth century by the abaiseMugwana, remained powerful. Towards the end of the century there was no mwiseMugwana to care for it and several deaths in the village were attributed to this neglect. Nampala, a son of Gonza Bato and a *kisoko* chief, was obliged to recruit a mwiseMugwana from Bunya (in southern Busoga) and give him a large plot. Wanambogo *musambwa* in Busu was retained by the abaiseKaluuba, a clan which did rule a small polity in south central Busoga.

In some states of Busoga the ancestors of the royal clan approached the status of national ancestors, but this was not the case in Kigulu. When the abaiseNgobi came to Ighawu, their *nkuni* settled at Nkazigheru. At this place the abaiseKiyemba had a *musambwa* called Nkazigheru, but apparently they kept their shrine by becoming the clients of the abaiseNgobi. The abaiseNgobi *nkuni* was a distinct shrine whose *muzimu* (ancestral spirit) possessed only abaiseNgobi women. The abaiseNgobi took chickens and goats there when they wanted to ask for rain, but they also took the same offerings to Waitambogwe. That the abaiseNgobi religious institutions were influenced by the religious systems of southern Busoga, of which the *misambwa* cults were a fundamental part, can be explained in terms of their relationship to some of these cults. AbaiseNgobi success in fostering the loyalty of the people toward their own rule was partly due to their hegemony over many of these shrines. Under abaiseNgobi ownership these *misambwa* operated for the benefit of the people, but their ability to focus local loyalties was inhibited. As for the abaiseNgobi

nkuni it could hardly become a 'national' cult since it was only one of many religious resources and had to compete with a venerable tradition. Instead it became almost a part of that tradition.

Each homestead within a *mutala* practised subsistence agriculture, pattern, the system of informal local exchange, and the trading contacts with the Lake Victoria littoral—also affected the degree to which the abaiseNgobi were successful in overcoming localized loyalties.

Each homestead within a *mutala* practiced subsistence agriculture. Plantains were the staple food crop and nearly every part of the plantain plant was put to some practical use. Chickens, goats, and cattle were kept. Although southern Kigulu County is in a climatic zone less suitable for cattle-keeping than the northern part of the county, in the nineteenth century there were some sizeable herds in both Nawansinge and Ighawu. Building materials and usually barkcloth trees were found on each plot. Salt was obtained from papyrus ashes. Thus, in many ways the homesteads themselves were self-sufficient.

Blacksmithing was the most important specialist craft practised in Southern Kigulu. In the late nineteenth century there were two blacksmiths here—one in Nawansinge and one in Ighawu. Like blacksmiths in other parts of Busoga, which lacks iron deposits, they made agricultural implements and spearheads from old hoes. New hoes came from Bunyoro and Bugwe, but for part of the nineteenth century, there was an exceptional hoe-making blacksmith in the valley between Nawansinge and Ighawu. This man had been born in Nawansinge and was still smithing in the 1870s. It is said that his father had also been a blacksmith. People brought slaves from distant places and exchanged them for hoes. He was very rich and kept some of the slaves to look after his herd of cattle. The other slaves were sent to Bugabula for iron.

Although barkcloth-making was a rather common activity, each village had some specialist clothmakers. Barkcloth was an important trade commodity, exchangeable for any other commodity, including cattle. Nevertheless, a specialist barkcloth-maker did not acquire the property that a blacksmith might; at best he was a little better off than the ordinary cultivator. Apparently only the very best cloth could fetch a profit in the long distance trade, for example, to Bunyoro via Bugabula in the north-western corner of Busoga. However, as a commodity of informal exchange it promoted the redistribution of local products.

Informal exchange operated within a village, among the villages of Southern Kigulu, and between them and neighbouring villages. For example, chickens and barkcloth were bartered for the products of a blacksmith, chickens for goats, and barkcloth for food in time of famine. This informal trade, facilitated by relatives and friends in other villages, extended southwards to link Southern Kigulu with the famous markets of southern Busoga. Since Southern Kigulu lacks clay suitable for pottery, the people got their

pots from Bugulu, where the potting tradition stretches back several centuries. Trading contacts between southern Kigulu and southern Busoga were probably as ancient as this need for pottery. The steady migration from southern Busoga helped to maintain these contacts.

Economic self-sufficiency as a factor in the instability of the Soga states was pointed out by Fallers.⁸ Gonza Bato might have strengthened his position by taking an active part in the exchange system. That he did not is particularly interesting since in northern Kigulu the chiefs appear to have been the middlemen, through their agents, in the trade with Bugabula. Chiefs often regulated markets by the appointment of a *muwooza* to collect market fees in kind. The few centres of exchange in Kigulu are remembered as insignificant compared to the markets of Bunya. Gonza Bato's domain did not include any markets although Igamba, later called Iganga, was a neighbouring *mutala*. During the 1870s Iganga remained a small market in the hands of a client of Ngobi Walusansa. The economic activities of Gonza Bato's administration were confined to the collection of tribute, mostly redistributed in feasts, and to the appropriation of property from a commoner who was considered too rich, a practice usually exaggerated.

Despite a *mutaia*'s religious and economic self-sufficiency its residents might not be able to defend themselves from attacks by another village or group of villages. Throughout Busoga every able-bodied man was expected to defend his village. Those who distinguished themselves in fighting were known as *abazira*. Their informal leadership was often the decisive factor—a village without them was considered defenceless. Here is a very understandable motive for the acceptance of abaiseNgobi hegemony. Prestige and resources, especially the power to allot land, enabled a mwiseNgobi ruler to recruit *abazira* from elsewhere. This gave a military advantage and, hypothetically, he could extend his territory by attacking a village, leaving it defenceless by killing its *abazira*, and then offering it protection if it would submit to his rule. Returning to the case of Southern Kigulu, Nawansinge's resistance is understandable in terms of an unusual number of *abazira* and the weak position of the abaiseNgobi who had just made their initial thrust into this area. Otherwise, it is not surprising that Gonza Bato's political ascendance coincided with an external threat from Luuka. His rule meant an end to intervillage raiding among a certain group of *mitaia* and provided *abazira* to deal with any attack from their neighbours. From the perspective of the ordinary cultivator, the security offered by a prince must have gone a long way toward compensating for the produce and services which he had to render him.

The feasts given by Gonza Bato also helped to bring the people of the various *mitala* together. While some chiefs are remembered as infrequent feast-givers, giving only the expected feasts for *abazira*, Gonza Bato's enduring fame rests on the feasts which he gave for all his people. His nickname "Gabula" probably originated from the feasts which he gave

for his *abazira* during the wars against Luuka. At least the traditions of his collaboration with Ngobi Nkobe in these wars refer to him as "Gabula". After the mid-century succession disputes, when he was re-establishing himself locally, he continued to give many feasts even though he was fighting no wars. He did, of course, have *abazira* as protection against raids from other villages, but descriptions of these feasts emphasize that they were not given for any special group and that they were a form of economic redistribution. Feasts helped to counteract localized loyalties by providing an opportunity for people from all the villages of congregate at the mbuga in circumstances which encouraged them to think of themselves primarily as Gonza Bato's subjects.

Do these feasts represent a conscious effort on the part of Gonza Bato to direct the loyalties of the people towards his polity as a centre of unity and authority? He must have realised that they enhanced his popularity. At one time he had been a cruel ruler with the nickname "Musongola", which means, "the Sharpener". Some informants have linked his failure in the succession disputes to his cruel practices; the *bakungu* would not support him because he was unpopular with the people. However, he mended his ways and became "Gonza Bato", which means, "the Lover of Small Children". Literally, this name implies a paternalistic ruler. However, it is not necessary to interpret his feast-giving as a deliberate policy—it can be viewed simply as part of his response to the situation.

However, the integrative role of feasting should not be over-emphasized. Although they were given for the residents of all the *mitala*, it has been claimed that the people of Ighawu were better represented since it was difficult to cross the valley between Nawansinge and Ighawu. In addition it should be noted that people also participated in other feasts and that some of these re-inforced local loyalties, for example, the feasts held after sacrifices to a local *musambwa*, while others fostered ties outside the polity, for example, those given for a kinship or affinal group.

Ultimately, it was the nature of Gonza Bato's administrative system which held the polity together. The traditions of Southern Kigulu indicate, as already discussed, that gradual incorporation was part of the process of abaiseNgobi expansion. According to one informant, commoners, as overseers of the *bisoko* which had been taken over, played an important part in the initial phases of abaiseNgobi rule. Unfortunately very little is known of Gonza Bato's administration in the period prior to the succession disputes, but this assertion is consistent with his incorporation of commoners and newcomers into the political community in the period after the disputes.

By the 1870s Gonza Bato had regained control over *bisoko* which he had previously held as well as over new *bisoko*. From his base in Ighawu he finally took Busu from his collateral relatives. He and the mwiseNgobi ruler of Bukoyo divided Buwoya between them. Through the intermediary of Mudhumbusi, his mother's brother, he brought Nawansinge at last into

the abaiseNgobi orbit. Thus, he was able to reorganize *bisoko* divisions so that some authority might be delegated to his sons, but there were opportunities for commoners as well. In Ighawu most *bisoko* were held by princes, but one was held by a *muzira* and one by a family of religious importance. In Nawansinge one *kisoko* was held by a mwiseKyema *muzira* and one by a mwiseMuhaya. Busu like Ighawu was dominated by princes, but he may have appointed a *muzira* to overlook the *mutala* as a whole on his behalf. He divided Namasoga into two *bisoko*, both given to commoners.

Commoners who became administrators were called *bakungu*. In the local context a *mukungu* was anyone who frequented the *mbuga*, showing an interest in its affairs. He was expected to supervise beer-making, entertain the chief's guests, and help settle disputes. His only sure reward was what he ate and drank at the *mbuga*, but potentially he might become a *kisoko* chief. In choosing his *bakungu* Gonza Bato made no attempt to represent the different clans although, given the clan heterogeneity of his subjects, they were in fact from several clans.

The *mutala* chief of Nawansinge was Gonza Bato's most important *mukungu*. In the 1860s he astutely rewarded the abaiseMuhaya by appointing Mudhumbusi his "Katikikiro". Like Kagolo before him, Mudhumbusi was the *mutala* chief of Nawansinge. As the traditions are related today, this chief is thought to stand in relation to the prince as his chief adviser, but there is some doubt as to whether he was really called "Katikikiro".⁹ Mudhumbusi's title may have been "Walukulira". In any case his duties, except for occasional visits to the *mbuga*, were relatively few. His real power lay in Nawansinge where he had his own *mbuga*, *bakungu*, and *abazira*. Gonzo Bato probably regarded him more as an "ally" than as a "subordinate".

Lundhaya continued as Kalabalaba, a position more important than mere assistant to the Katikikiro. He was responsible for disputes being appealed beyond the level of the *mutala* chief and for formally granting land tenure on behalf of his prince.

The judicial aspect of Gonza Bato's administration was as decentralized as possible. A dispute was first taken to the *kisoko* chief, who usually settled it. If the disputants did not accept his judgement, which usually involved the payment of compensation, they could appeal to the *mutala* chief, and then to the Kalabalaba. The *bakungu* at each level formed a council to hear the arguments of the disputants and help the chief come to a decision. Mudhumbusi had his own *bakungu* to help him decide disputes in Nawansinge, but at the intervillage level Lundhaya was evidently more active. When a dispute was to pass on to Gonza Bato, however, it was taken by Mudhumbusi. Disputes rarely reached this level since the disputants were warned that a much harsher decision would be the result.

Other duties of the subordinate chiefs included mobilizing the able-bodied men when the chief was planning a raid, gathering beer and food

from the commoners and taking these to the *mbuga*, and choosing the best barkcloths for the chief. Often it is claimed that the expropriatory power of the chiefs on behalf of the prince was so great that "...no *mukopi* could own any good things". His goats, cows, even beautiful wives and children would be brought to the *mbuga*. This is contradicted by the "accumulation process" which is used to account for the wealth of certain men. To take the case of a blacksmith: for every spear he got two chickens—when these multiplied he might trade them for a goat—when the goats multiplied he might trade them for a herd of cattle. At least some commoners were allowed to acquire substantial wealth in cattle. Perhaps the most striking example was the hoe-making blacksmith between Nawansinge and Ighawu. Another in Balidha, a *mwiseMugwana* of Ighawu, who was neither a craftsman nor a *mukungu*. Sometimes, of course, the commoners were anxious to offer their best to the chief in the hope that they might ingratiate themselves into the system.

A prince strengthened his position by marrying many women from his own polity. If he wished to encourage friendly relations with another polity, he could send a sister or daughter to marry there. Gonza Bato sent his sister to the ruler of Buima. Locally, he might give his daughters to his *abazira* and *bakungu*. His chiefs often collected pretty girls and brought them more closely into the system and usually promoted the fortunes of their families. A *mukungu* might give his daughter to a more influential *mukungu*. Commoners often married women from the villages to the south. Some of these women had been brought up from Bunya to become wives and others were the sisters and daughters of the newcomers. Gonza Bato's own mother was from an immigrant family. In general marriage in Southern Kigulu had an alliance function which bound royal and commoner families together and which facilitated the absorption of immigrants.

The political aspect of marriage is more explicit in terms of the potential rewards. According to the commonly accepted institutional model, Gonza Bato's appointment of a *mwiseMuhaya* Katikikiro was in line with accepted procedure. Depending on the context, service to the prince as well as kinship is used to explain the delegation of authority to in-laws. Gonza Bato gave the *bisoko* of Namasoga to the *abaiseNkwalu* and *abaiseIgulu*, both immigrant families from Bunya, for their services and because they were the mothers of princes. Recalling the part which the *abaiseMuhaya* played in rescuing Gonza Bato after his failure in the succession disputes, it can be said that power accrued only to those relatives already strong enough to support their prince.

Even those *abazira* who were not *bisoko* chiefs were generously rewarded by the prince. They were given the best plots on the border areas where they could be ready for any attack. In fact, a *muzira* needed a large plot since he had many wives, often given to him by the prince, and was expected to keep his grown sons with him to assist in the defence of the

territory. If he had plenty of land, his clansmen from other parts of Busoga would join him and he could give them a plot. Some of Gonza Bato's *abazira* were local men who had distinguished themselves in battle. Others had been rescruited, for example, the abaiseWaguma from Buima. Considering relations between Nawansinge and the abaiseNgobi, it is not surprising that the *abazira* in Nawansinge were *bataka*. Perhaps the most influential *abazira* of Gonza Bato were the abaiseKiyemba. A mwiseKiyemba *muzira* guarded him at his *mbuga*. Later this man did become a *kisoko* chief in Busu.

Many other commoners, mostly immigrants, were allotted tracts of land as rewards for their services. The abaiseMukuve came from Bukooli seeking land and served Gonza Bato by hunting for him. The abaiseNdhego, also from Mukooli, sought refuge here because they were the in-laws of Gonza Bato. Kiiso, the head of this family was given land and became a hunter. When Isolonko, a wiseKiyimba, migrated from Buvuma, he gave his daughter Tukuwa to Gonza Bato. After her son Katekalusi succeeded his father, other groups of abaiseKiyimba came from the south to seek their fortune here. The same thing had happened when Gonza Bato appointed Mudhumbusi Katikikiro and *mutala* chief of Nawansinge: his clansmen from other parts of Kigulu joined him there. This was possible because these clients were allowed to transfer some of their land to their immigrant clansmen. Structurally, these immigrant enclaves were a vital part of the system. Since they were more closely tied to the ruler than the indigenous inhabitants, who tended to remember former loyalties, they offset these localized loyalties and so pulled the several communities of the polity towards the prince as a focus of unity.

How did Fallers' institutional principles—patrilineal kinship, ascribed rank, and the patron-client relationship¹⁰—operate in the political system of Southern Kigulu? By the 1870s abaiseNgobi rule had been consolidated and the principle of ascribed rank, as Fallers described it, was accepted. However, as in all Soga states this principle was modified by the patron-client relationship. Clientship to a prince was a particular form of the political service which every adult rendered to the community. Summarizing the main points of this article in terms of service illustrates more clearly the extent to which clientship contributed to the viability of Gonza Bato's political system. The advantage of this approach is that all the services by the prince for the people, and by the people for the prince, are taken into account in trying to understand the system.

In at least one significant way all Gonza Bato's subjects served him and were served by him. The humblest cultivator could serve his prince by providing the food for a feast. In turn the prince offered an entertaining community gathering. The subordinate chiefs rendered service to him, but also promoted order within and among the village communities through their judicial functions. Although the *abazira* were his direct clients, they served him by protecting not only his authority, but the people as well.

Thus, the most important services performed for Gonza Bato by his clients benefited the people in just those instances where the village community was least self-sufficient.

Those clients whose service to Gonza Bato was of a more personal kind also contributed to the success of the system. The critical fact here is that slightly more than half of the *bisoko* chiefs were not clients, but princes, the sons of Gonza Bato. All those commoners with special links to Gonza Bato were complementary to the client-chiefs and *abazira* in forming a commoner political 'in-groups' which acted as a necessary structural balance to the princes.

For another perspective the benefits of Gonza Bato's rule derive from the increase in scale which his polity represents.¹¹ The discussion can now return to the structural position of the local community *vis-à-vis* the polity. The real issue here is to what extent the new territorial arrangement of the polity became the basis for a new level of community.

Within each *mutala* communications were good, but swamps and streams tended to discourage purely social contacts between *mitala*. In other words, the ordinary person usually had some special reason for visiting another *mutala* and the community of everyday life was one's own *mutala*. Defining community as the areas of common life and the boundaries of community as the boundaries of many-sided relations, it is apparent that in Southern Kigulu in the last half of the nineteenth century a community was developing at the level of the polity. Using intensity of relations as a criterion, this community bound the people together politically more than socially, and socially more than economically.

Gonza Bato's *mbuga* in Ighawu was the focal point of the political community. Here he gave the feasts for which he became so famous. If a dispute could not be settled by the Kalabalaba and the Katikikiro, the disputants could go there for a decision. Men gathered at the *mbuga* every day to drink beer, entertain his guests, and sometimes help decide cases. However, since the *mitala* and *bisoko* chiefs had *mbuga* and *bakungu* of their own, whether they were princes or commoners, it was personal loyalty to Gonza Bato which held the political community together. While feasts were important socially, undoubtedly fostering a feeling of community among his subjects, they were not the real cohesive political factor. The immigrant enclaves were structurally significant in that they owed their place in the community to the prince's good graces. The consolidation of abaiseNgobi rule in Southern Kigulu resulted from the ways in which old and new residents were brought into the system of administration and into the service of the prince.

FOOTNOTES

1. Literally the prefix "abaise" means "those of the father..." Soga clans are

eponymous, patrilineal, exogamous, and dispersed with the effective corporate unit being a shallow patrilineage of three to four generations. Other abaiseNgobi branches ruled in Bugabula, Bulamogi, Bokono, and Luuka. For a detailed discussion of clan history, origins, and migrations, see David Cohen's *Mukama and Kintu*, Ph.D. Dissertation, London, 1970 or his book *Historical Tradition of Busoga: Mukama and Kintu*, Clarendon Press, 1972.

2. The main sources for this article are Kigulu Historical Texts 34-72, the original fieldwork of the author. The other primary sources are from "Collected Texts: Busoga Traditional History", collected, translated, edited and annotated by David Cohen, specifically, CTBTH numbers 64, 419, 421, 494, 741, and 759.
3. These are the dates for the active life of Gonza Bato, the dating for which has been discussed in detail in the author's seminar paper: "Gonza Bato and the Consolidation of AbaiseNgobi Rule in Southern Kigulu", Makerere University, Department of History (MSP/3/1972/73), August 21, 1972. The dating for the Kintu and Mukama migrations is from Cohen, *Mukama and Kintu*, pp. 129-130 and 185-188. The dates for the rulers of Buzimba are from Cohen's "Survey of Interlacustrine Chronology", *Journal of African History*, xi, 2(1970), pp. 177-201.
4. It is possible, but unlikely, that Gonza Bato was his father's appointee. See the author's seminar paper MSP/3/1972/73. Gonza Bato certainly faced competition from his elder brothers—his collateral relatives retained control over Busu until c. 1870.
5. This is the list of Mboli, CTBTH 742 which was accepted by David Cohen and by Kazungu in his "Political Centralization in Precolonial Kigulu", Graduating Essay, Makerere University, Department of History, 1970.
6. Chicago, 1965 (originally published 1956), pp. 51 and 63.
7. Kigulu Historical Text 39.
8. *Bantu Bureaucracy*, p. 143.
9. The Soga equivalent is "Kitukiro". For implication that the original title in Southern Kigulu was "Walukulira" see Kigulu Historical Text 39.
10. *Bantu Bureaucracy*, pp. 126-128. The variable operations of these principles was reviewed by David Cohen, in terms of his own material, in "Emergence and Crisis: The States of Busoga in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries", Makerere University, Kampala, History Department (MSP/17/71/72).
11. The concept of scale used here is adapted from that of Godfrey and Monica Wilson as presented in *The Analysis of Social Change*, Cambridge, 1968, first published 1945.

SOME POLITICAL EFFECTS OF BRITISH EDUCATIONAL POLICY IN EGYPT

KAREN L. KONING

Many studies on Egypt of the late 19th and 20th century¹ reflect the central role of education and the educated in promoting political change. Among the most important developments during the British period in Egypt, 1882-1921, were the beginnings of political party activity and the rise of a nationalist movement. The aim of this article is to examine British educational policy as a contribution to this particular political environment.

BACKGROUND

In order to analyse British responsibility for the results of Education, it is necessary to determine circumstances existing in Egypt in 1882. The embarrassing financial situation loomed large in excusing the meagre expenditures devoted to the advancement of learning. In addition to minimal monetary allocations, education suffered from what Cromer labelled the "idiosyncracies of Pashadom". He condemned the "ignorance and prejudice" of the pashas which made for inconsistent, unimaginative policies and he deplored the frequent turnover of school directors² which resulted in no less than 29 men serving as Minister of Public Instruction in 29 years, each of whom sought to reverse the actions of his predecessor, to the "upset and demoralisation of the schools."³

A third factor in the educational situation was the commanding presence of al-Azhar (actually the entire religious school system from Azhar to the *kuttabs* or mosque schools) standing distinctly alongside the Westernizing modernizing government school structure erected by Muhammad Ali.⁴ These two main streams, one stagnantly religious, one ineffectually pseudo-European, as well as the foreign (usually missionary) and indigenous private schools, produced a situation of educational and cultural ambiguity.⁵

Let us look in some detail at the problem of the multiple school system and some of its ramifications.

THE SYSTEM

The separation of religious and governmental schools first carried out by Muhammad Ali previewed developments under the British when there came to be students in religious, government, indigenous and foreign private schools, as well as a group of students being educated abroad, all in increasing numbers.

The acquisition of a diploma had become a stepping stone into the

socio-politico-economic system;⁶ consequently, the demand for education grew. When government schools proved physically (and educationally) inadequate, indigenous private schools mushroomed. These soon earned such labels as "the worst evil"⁷ and "one of the most disastrous results. . . ."⁸ Since there was little or no control over these institutions, fees were as low as entry requirements and the standard of education and discipline.⁹

The following table indicates the disparity among types of schools: (From a 10-year report on Secondary Schools exams).

Part I

Government: Schools, 314 pass out of 849.

Government inspected private schools, 309 pass out of 2,020.

Other private schools, 264 pass out of 1,824.¹⁰

For those families with sufficient interest, awareness and economic capability, therefore, the best recourse for training their children was the foreign school system, especially the French.¹¹ Here, where better teaching and discipline prevailed, the students were affected by the schools' complete autonomy and anti-British mentality.¹² If the further step of study abroad was taken, then potential European influence became even more significant. The British presence did realize some gains at this level through a shift to English schools and into the humanities.¹³

Lastly, al-Azhar shares in the school system defaults. Its permeating role in moulding the minds of Egyptians is indisputable.¹⁴ Functioning as the prestigious religious education centre of the Muslim world, its traditional curriculum and teaching methods ambivalently affected thinking and political processes in a country it had served appropriately in the past, but which was contending now with the forces of change.

CURRICULUM

A closer examination of curriculum emphases and the aim and medium of instruction will help in understanding consequent political effects. The memorization method of learning, functional for the traditional Islamic sciences, invaded all stages of education¹⁵ and was strengthened and extended under inflexible British handling of student training geared to final exam results.¹⁶ The lower schools, bound to this emphasis on memory, suffered further from the favouritism shown to the secondary schools which occurred despite Cromer's stated policy to encourage sound elementary education¹⁷ and the fact that the *fallahin*, who enjoyed educational opportunities usually terminating before the secondary level, contributed the bulk of educational revenue.¹⁸

The restrictions of a memorization teaching method and a secondary school focus were reinforced by the almost singular educational aim, that of entering government service. Muhammad Ali introduced the system,¹⁹ the British perpetuated it,²⁰ and the Egyptians accepted it without demanding more than that it provide fulfilment of an economic goal for them. What occurred

was the movement of students from "factories of religious mendicants" to "factories of Government officials".²¹ There is some evidence that, aside from oiling the bureaucratic machinery, low standards aimed at turning out dependent petty civil servants and providing a minimum standard of education for the "masses". This was a deliberate attempt to prevent the rise of a nationalist intelligentsia or a public responsive to nationalist ideas, thus serving to maintain British rule.²²

Still another British contribution to the inadequacy of instruction and learning was the use of the English language at the post-primary level. Again, the result of students' trying to cope with advanced subjects under foreign teachers in a foreign language was the memorization of notes and texts.

Since contact with English outside school was non-existent, the commuting students never had the opportunity to comprehend the nature and substance of the materials given them in class.²³ The British insistence upon English, due in part to competition with the French tongue lingering from pre-occupation days, relaxed somewhat after the 1904 Anglo-French Entente and in response to Egyptian agitation for Arabic instruction.²⁴ The upsurge of Arabic created new problems, however, in the shape of a dearth of qualified instructors and satisfactory teaching materials in the "modern" fields of study which had been introduced.^{25*}

GROWING BRITISH AWARENESS

British acknowledgement of the political results of their school system educated, al-Azhar's religious isolation and nationalist fomentation and the operation focuses mainly on the gaps created between the masses and the enlightened ideas about independence acquired by the students who found their way abroad. Cromer, e.g., saw a rise of political demagoguery which could be countered only by educating the masses to be able to dismiss the "hair-brained" schemes of half educated political charlatans.²⁶ Azhar's position outside the control of the British and its concern with maintaining itself against the modernizing threat posed to it, led to its resentment of and aggressiveness towards the West and its functioning as a centre for anti-British agitation.²⁷ The blame for "subversive" ideas brought back from abroad is laid upon the age of the students which made them "dangerously accessible" to the worst alien influences.²⁸

THE GAPS

Societal-wide effects of producing a duality, or multiplicity, of cultures through variant educational systems have been pervasive and long-standing

* (Sections on *The British Staff*, detailing their unimpressive teaching qualifications and their condescending attitudes toward Egyptian staff and students alike; and *Personalities*, concentrating on Douglas Dunlop, Adviser to the Minister of Education for eight years, and Saad Zaghlul, the first Minister of Public Instruction and later a nationalist leader, have been omitted for reasons of space)

in Egypt. For the period under discussion, the most significant political effects came from creating a small "modern" educated group (which saw itself as the advance guard of the Egyptian nation²⁹ and indeed became a social and economic elite as well³⁰) divorced from their heritage enough to make use of ideas absorbed from European thinkers but not so much that they could not (at this time at least) co-operate with the religiously educated to act on their aspirations for independence.³¹ In fact, the divisions perpetrated by education helped to encourage various groups to unite behind the one obvious common grievance: the presence of an oppressive foreign power.³²

At the same time that the educated from many fields stepped into politics,³³ the spreading cognizance of the value of education (the most ignorant and poorest of the *fdilahin* wanted to send their sons to school in hopes of obtaining government employ) made the people more susceptible to the leadership of those who enjoyed the benefits of higher learning.

New ideas gaining ground may have come from abroad, from students educated out of Egypt or through the growing mass media, but their popularity derived largely from the ambiguous climate which British educational policy was producing (i.e. an emphasis on education unbalanced by lack of discipline and any standard of thought and behaviour). The incompetence which prevailed in the private schools and the indifference characteristic of the state schools was bound to create a restless and insubordinate constituency ripe for exploitation by political propagandists.³⁴ Education, by being at the same time controlled yet badly neglected by the state, had become confused with the state and thus with politics.³⁵

UNEMPLOYMENT

Frustration which found its outlet in politicization was magnified by curriculum policy results, viz. unemployment and sterile thinking processes.

The British had heightened the desire for education by dangling the reward of state service; young men were lured away from the countryside and other job possibilities of a manual nature. When the market for their aspirations became slimmer or they failed to pass their exams, they found themselves rootless in both their old and new surroundings.³⁶ Their education had awakened ambitions in them, had imbued them with some notion of personal and national independence (without encouraging independent thinking) and their subsequent dissatisfaction with their purposelessness was directed naturally against the government which had raised their hopes and then let them down.³⁷

MODES OF THOUGHT

Although the uniform centralization and rote learning method of the curriculum acted to subdue independence and originality, the concomitant lack of initiative coupled with a history of captivity with rhetoric made

the students an obvious target for emotionally inspiring national figures.³⁸ They found no inspiration in the school room *per se*, but the educational process prompted them to be inspired by political issues. Following Mustafa Kamal, the students increasingly became incensed about the political enslavement of their country, and the first object of their disdain became the "intruding" and "usurping" school masters.³⁹ The very innocuousness of the teachers which helped initiate the political consciousness of the students turned back upon the teachers in that they could not handle the students' attacking them as bad parts of a corrupt system.

Whether in the moral terms of British officials, the religious terms of the traditional Egyptians, the political terms of the modernizing Egyptians or the intellectual terms of later analysts, the consensus was that a school system without a sound, consistent foundation helps to produce and politicize a confused, vulnerable community.⁴⁰ Hence, the transitional strains plaguing the Egyptian polity since Muhammad Ali (or the arrival of Bonaparte) were heightened by contradictory or inconsistent values bred through multiple educational systems, all of which themselves were out of touch in some way with the realities of the existing situation.⁴¹

AN ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION

It seems only just to add to this indictment of British policy some reference to the political effects of alien education in transitional societies. Now that specific results have been extrapolated from specific policy, the point must be made that the introduction of a "modern" educational system in a society oppressed in any way most probably will produce political repercussions. When only the students are politicized, a strong government can manage or isolate any consequences; but when circumstances permit various elements of society to be affected and when the government is foreign or weak in some other way, the students (broadly speaking) may become the managers.

CONCLUSIONS

The British were aware, and afraid, that they were propagating an awakening⁴² of new knowledge and ambitions and a spirit of independence which could be satisfied only by the recipients' sharing in government and administration,⁴³ but they misunderstood the precise development of these processes and the means of channelling them.⁴⁴

Education is credited with being the most important instrument for readjusting the modern/traditional dichotomy, but it must at the same time bear responsibility for aggravating societal tensions at certain stages which result from the decline of traditional influence, if an adequate substitute is not supplied.⁴⁵ The necessity of national education is accepted,⁴⁶ for escape from international demands and pressures is not possible, but when modernizing methods and ideals encroach not so gradually and

from a clear and present foreign force and heritage, the first result is likely to be an anti-foreign nationalist politicization.⁴⁷

Egypt exemplified this process. Democratic seepages from the British mentality were accumulated in an abstract, memorized form,⁴⁸ allowing their easy exploitation by nationalist ideologies. The ideologies themselves were the product of an education which had tantalized them with ideas of freedom and participation, then left them unemployed. They had become an elite which valued achievement, but found no outlet for their achievement.⁴⁹ So in their educated leisure they revolted and found a ready audience for their revolt.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. e.g. Safran's *In Search of Political Community*; Ahmed's *Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism*; Hourani's *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*; or the biographical *Education of Salama Musa*.
2. Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, 1908, pp. 528-9.
3. Humphrey Bowman, *Middle-East Window*, 1942, pp. 48.
4. Alfred Milner, *England in Egypt*, 1894, p. 370. Milner says the Muhammad Ali schools were devoted to quantity at the expense of quality as regards subject matter—typical of a “lower civilization trying to adopt the results of a higher without understanding it.”
5. Bowman, pp. 46-7.
6. Cromer, in trying to limit school enrolment and job applicants, made diplomas mandatory for entering a higher level school and the civil service, actually increasing discontent when there still proved to be a surplus of graduates for higher level schools and the employment market.
7. Sir Valentine Chirol, *The Egyptian Problem*, 1921, p. 225.
8. Lord Lloyd, *Egypt Since Cromer*, Volume 1, 1933, p. 164.
9. Chirol, p. 125; Lloyd, p. 104.
10. Chirol, p. 228.
11. Robert Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt*, 1966, p. 333.
12. Chirol, p. 226; Lloyd, p. 166.
13. Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, 1961, p. 55. Previously 80% had studied in France, 96% in technical fields; now 75% went to Britain and 65% took up humanities and social sciences. Tignor, p. 338, quotes the 1910 Gorst Report that the majority of students in Europe were pursuing maths and science courses, but he also cites another scholar, p. 339, who said 2/3 were studying humanities.
14. Chirol, p. 233.
15. This became more true when the British tried to develop the primary schools by wedding the *kuttabs* to the government secondary schools. John Marlowe, *A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations*, 1958.
16. P. G. Elgood, *Egypt and the Army*, 1924, p. 217.
17. Cromer, p. 534.
18. Chirol, p. 222. Marlowe, p. 189, states somewhat differently that too many were receiving no education at all, too many were going from primary to secondary schools; and only the rich could go on with the higher or technical education.
19. Chirol, p. 237.
20. Lloyd, p. 168, attributes the government service concern of the British to the

- influence of Macaulay who drew upon the Indian colonial experience to give advice.
21. Lloyd, p. 166; Tignor, p. 323, says that by 1900 all but 177 of 729 primary school graduates since 1889 had elected to work for the state.
 22. Tignor, p. 320; George Young, *Egypt*, 1927, p. 166; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid *Egypt and Cromer*, 1968, pp. 176-7. For a scathing attack on the Cromer/Dunlop means and ends (the production of "dumb" teachers and students, e.g.), see 'Umar Dusuqi, *Fi al-Adab al-Hadith*, 1967, pp. 22-4.
 23. Bowman, p. 62.
 24. Chirol, p. 228.
 25. Furthermore, a quarrel seems to have arisen between the British and the Egyptians over colloquial vs. classical Arabic. See Dusuqi, Chapter I.
 26. Cromer, p. 534.
 27. Chirol, pp. 239 and 241.
 28. Chirol, p. 226.
 29. Young, p. 182.
 30. Safran, p. 126.
 31. Jamal Muhammad Ahmad, *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism*, 1960, p. 57. He says that from the national university and the Shari'ah schools emerged a group of young men who met in groups to discuss nationalism, education, etc., some of them later to be famous....
 32. Elgood, p. 8; Lutfi al-Sayyid, p. 193; Tignor, p. 387.
 33. Safran, p. 128.
 34. James Coleman, *Education and Political Development*, 1965, p. 173.
 35. Ahmed, p. 103; Young, p. 182, assigns cause and effect rather differently by saying that systematic exclusion of the nation from political education makes the education system political.
 36. Chirol, p. 227; Marlowe, p. 190.
 37. Marlowe, p. 202, asserts that it became an economic necessity for the student to blackmail the government through political agitation for employment. (The literatures on the unemployed intelligentsia is vast).
 38. Elgood, p. 22. Marlowe, p. 190, sees the illiterate masses following a parallel course. They were apathetic but responsive to organized agitation.
 39. Elgood, p. 217.
 40. See Ahmed, p. 101, and Safran, p. 207, in addition to previous British sources.
 41. Lutfi al-Sayyid, p. 139, sums up the result: a group of disoriented youngsters who found their raison d'être in the nationalist movement.
 42. Cromer, 530.
 43. W. E. P. Newman, *Great Britain in Egypt*, 1938, p. 164; Elgood, p. 8; Tignor, p. 386.
 44. Tignor, p. 348, says Cromer's policies had just the effect he was trying to avoid: the creation of disoriented intellectuals.
 45. Safran, pp. 206-7.
 46. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 1962, p. 158.
 47. Safran, p. 208.
 48. Safran, p. 148.
 49. Coleman, p. 26.

NAMIBIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ITS LIBERATION (REVIEW)

BENON TURYAHIKAYO-RUGYEMA

I am not sure whether the theme of my talk... is the hackneyed one of the "eternal triangle", two suitors claiming the hand of one fair lady, whether it is the oft-told tale of the stern guardian refusing the hand of his own ward in marriage to her persistent wooer, with whom in this case she has been living for the last fifty years.¹

The above statement puts in a nutshell the position of Namibia in its relation to South Africa and the United Nations. However, Namibia is not cherished because of its beauty, or for that matter its wealth; rather, it is the occupation of this territory by South Africa with its obnoxious policy of apartheid that has intrigued the whole world for many years. A quick review of its history, physical characteristics and resources, and its people and their government will serve as a background to the struggle for the liberation of this territory by the people of Namibia.

Namibia is a vast and almost empty space. Almost half the size of Kenya, nine times the size of Ghana, slightly smaller in size than Nigeria and Tanzania, Namibia has a population of less than half a million people, with a density of one to two people per square mile.² It is bounded by Angola to the north and the Union of South Africa to the south, while to the west there lies the Pacific Ocean. The coastal strip to the west, sometimes referred to as the "skeleton coast", is a desert, the Namib, varying in width from fifty to eighty miles, almost uninhabitable except for the diamond workings near the mouth of the Orange River, and the two ports of Lüderitz and Walvis Bay. To the east lies the sandy, scrubland of the Kalahari desert, sharing a common border four to five hundred miles along with Botswana. Most of the people occupy the central plateau of the country, two to six thousand feet above sea level, between the Namib and Kalahari deserts.³

The population of the country is divided into three categories: the Africans, numbering from 447,000 to 572,000; 73,000 Europeans (Germans and South Africans of English or Dutch origin); and 22,000 Coloureds.⁴ The country itself is divided into two areas: the police zone, reserved for the white settlement, including a third of other non-whites, while the northern Bantu areas are occupied exclusively by the other two-thirds of the African people, the only exception being white officials and missionaries.⁵ The Bantu lived in four indigenous areas until the creation of the Bantustans in the late 1960's, the Ovambos being the most numerous, comprising 45.5

per cent of the total population. Each Bantustan area has its own government, headed by a council of chiefs who in most cases have no say in matters affecting their own people, as they are puppets of the South African government. The other groups include the Hereros (6.7 per cent), the Hottentots or Nama (6.6 per cent), the Bergdamara (8.4 per cent), the Bushmen (2.2 per cent), and the Coloureds (2.4 per cent).⁶ Each of these groups is dispersed in the police zone but restricted to certain areas in the reserves. The Bushmen have no permanent settlement even today, as a result of their mode of subsistence. The Rehebothers (2.1 per cent), coloured persons of mixed origin whose forebears emigrated from Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century, occupy the best land in the centre of the police zone.⁷

When Namibia was picked up by the Germans during the scramble for Africa, it was because Bismarck hoped to use it for diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at maintaining Germany's predominance in Europe rather than for economic motives. During the German occupation which lasted till World War I, Namibia almost became desolate. The period was coloured with brutality, entailing mass executions that within a short period decimated the Hereros from 80,000 to 15,000 men, women and children. In the process most of the best land was appropriated for the Europeans, thus depriving the people of their most cherished property. The First World War came as a blessing to the people of what was then known as Tanganyika (now Tanzania), itself a German possession, in that it later became a mandated territory and subsequently attained independence in 1961. But for Namibia the story was different. Namibia was conquered by General Botha of South Africa in a crushing defeat of the Germans in 1915. This right of conquest became null and void when Namibia became a mandate in 1919, but South still defies international law by maintaining the right of conquest at the expense of the mandate system. The attainment of mandate status by Namibia is the turning point in the history of that country in terms of its relation with South Africa.

At the peace conference in 1919, under article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, the future of Namibia was determined by the principal allied and associate powers. The principle of non-annexation and self-determination was upheld. In this context, in article 22 of the Covenant Germany as a defeated power was stripped of all its colonies; those territories whose inhabitants were not yet able to stand on their own feet were to be under the tutelage of more advanced nations, which would serve as "a sacred trust of civilization". Accordingly, the territories were classed as A, B, or C mandates, according to their level of development in a descending order.

Namibia fell into the C category and, since it was contiguous to South Africa, the latter assumed responsibility as a mandatory power in 1920. The main obligation of the mandatory power were to develop the territories so acquired politically, economically, and socially. However, enlightened statesmen have realized that this was nothing other than idealism as

contained in the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, with his colleagues Clemenceau and Lloyd George.⁸

In assuming the responsibility of a mandatory power over Namibia, both Botha and Field Marshal Jan Smuts of South Africa knew that it was a pious gesture on the part of the League of Nations to put Namibia under the tutelage of South Africa. In reality this was the annexation of Namibia to South Africa. This is understandable in the light of Botha's statement to the effect that "He would support the Covenant because he knew that the League of Nations would consist mostly of the same people who were present on that day, who understood the position and who would not make it impossible for any mandatory to govern the area".⁹ Further, Smuts himself revealed South Africa's intention of annexation when he indicated that Namibia was a state "inhabited by barbarians, who not only cannot possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas of political self-determination in the European sense".¹⁰

The Covenant itself could not have been much more outspoken when it laid down that territories such as Namibia, "owing to the sparseness of their population...or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory...can best be administered (under the laws of the mandatory) as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population".¹¹

The period after World War I reveals clearly that the Union of South Africa had no qualms about governing Namibia as an integral part of South Africa. Smuts himself revealed to a German deputation at Windhoek that "the mandate over South West Africa was nothing else but annexation". In 1925 he further confirmed the position of South Africa when he delivered a speech in Parliament:

I do not think that it is necessary for us to annex South West Africa to the Union. The mandate for me is enough, and it should be enough for the Union. It gives the Union such complete sovereignty, not only administrative, but legislative, that we need not ask for anything more.¹²

Whatever may have been the ideals which motivated the statesmen who conceived the framework of the mandate system, the particular time following the First World War was by no means a time favourable to the cause of the people of Namibia. For this was the era following the Boer War when Britain was imbued with the sense of appeasing the white settlers in the Union of South Africa. It was a period when the British-Boer struggle for racial supremacy in South Africa had resulted in the Act of Union of 1910, depriving the Africans of any political rights. There is no doubt that the British government was set on the road of winning over the confidence of the Boers at whatever cost.

The strategic importance and the newly discovered riches of Namibia

were very tempting to Boers. Thus, a bargain was struck between the British and Boers in which South Africa would agree to stay in the Commonwealth in return to being allowed to assume political control over Namibia. In theory Britain would be the overseer, since South Africa was obliged to exercise this right on her behalf; but in fact South Africa was given a free hand to extend its racial policy of apartheid over the people of Namibia.

In the 1920's there was friction between the Permanent Mandates Commission to which the mandatory power was supposed to render its account vis-à-vis its mandate as the South African government stepped up its policy of annexation of the territory with the intent of incorporating it into the Union. It was to be done through the settlement of whites of South African stock into Namibia in order to swamp the German settlers who had acquired land during the period of their occupation. The South African government crowned its policy by appointing a governor-general to rule over the area.¹³

Moving to the situation after World War II, when the victorious Allies were building the United Nations over the ruins and ashes of the defunct League of Nations, we find that one of their responsibilities was the replacement of the mandate system by a new system of international trusteeship, which was more in keeping with the charter of the United Nations.

The trusteeship scheme is delineated in Article 77 of the Charter, the text of which is as follows:

1. The Trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following category as may be placed there-under by means of trusteeship agreements:
 - (a) territories now held under mandate;
 - (b) territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
 - (c) territories voluntarily placed under the system of States responsible for their administration.
2. It will be a matter of subsequent agreements as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.¹⁴

All the mandatories except South Africa agreed. In fact, South Africa was under no obligation to abide by the resolution; there is no provision in the resolution that can compel any mandatory power to submit its mandated territory to the trusteeship system.

Smuts, who was then Prime Minister of South Africa, saw the loopholes in the text as adumbrated by the United Nations and declined to respect the decision of world opinion. If he had done so he would have jeopardized his cherished ideas of annexing Namibia to the Union of South Africa. He indicated that it would be convenient administratively as well as economically to amalgamate Namibia with South Africa. Smuts was shrewd enough to continue to submit to the United Nations the reports that the

mandatory power was expected to render to that body. Shortly after that, in 1948, Smuts lost power to the Nationalist Party, which continued the traditional South African attitude, but did so much more openly and directly. They soon stopped sending reports to the U.N. on the pretext that the mandate had terminated with the demise of the League of Nations. They took drastic measures to change the mode of government in Namibia by establishing representative bodies camouflaged under public opinion of both races. They established their position by asserting that it was within their purview to decide what was good for the people of Namibia. In its confused state the General Assembly hoped to bring South Africa to its senses by submitting the matter to one of its bodies: the International Court of Justice at the Hague. In one of its resolutions the Court declared that South Africa was under no obligation to place Namibia under trusteeship. The General Assembly has already passed about seventy-four resolutions calling upon South Africa to abide by the letter of the United Nations, but South Africa has stubbornly rejected all such resolutions. We could summarize the substance of the accusations in the International Court as follows: First, that despite the events that had happened the mandate was still in force, that the mandate agreement which had been entered into after 1919 had not expired. Second, that South Africa was under no obligation to transfer the mandated territories to the new trusteeship system. Third, however, that the U.N. did stand in the shoes of the League of Nations in respect to the mandated territories. Further—following from the above decisions—that it was still an obligation of the mandatory to render reports of the kind that it had to render in the days of the League, and also to forward to the United Nations petitions by people within the territory who felt themselves aggrieved.¹⁵ The South African government shielded itself by total suppression of any information regarding its policy of apartheid in Namibia by even refusing United Nations representatives to carry out any substantial investigation. The U.N. reacted by setting up a special committee to deal with the situation, though its progress was blocked by the South African government. However, it was at this time that the people of Namibia were allowed to present their case to the committee through an intermediary, Mr. Scott. The Namibians themselves were not allowed to present their grievances to the committee directly and as a body. At any rate, the result was much publicity of the South African activities in Namibia contrary to the official reports from the South African government itself.¹⁶

The failure of the United Nations to resolve the problem of annexation of Namibia prompted the independent African states at their second conference at Addis Ababa in June 1960 to appoint a committee to determine the status of Namibia. Ethiopia and Liberia, as former members of the League of Nations, were called upon to present this matter to the

International Court of Justice. The gist of the whole matter is presented as follows:

The subject of the dispute is the continued existence of the Mandate of South West Africa and the duties and the performance of the Union, as mandatory, thereunder. Liberia still insists that the Mandate is still in force; that the union continues duties thereunder, that the United Nations is the proper supervisory organ to which annual reports and petitions should be submitted by the Union, and whose consent is a legal pre-requisite and condition precedent to modification of the terms of the mandate; and that the Union has violated and is violating Article 32 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Articles 2, 4, 6, and 7 of the Mandate.¹⁷

The ruling which was finally delivered in 1966 alarmed the whole world. As usual there was convincing evidence in favour of Namibia, but the judges "decided not to decide". The matter was that those who were pro-South Africa on the court would not have given judgment without alienating South Africa. Moreover, they would have been contradicting themselves in the light of past resolutions in support of South Africa. The question arises: Did the African Committee of Independent States hope to influence world opinion by sidestepping the United Nations as a forum of world opinion? Perhaps not, but the organization of African Unity had acted in a desperate effort in order to secure a final judgment from the International Court.¹⁸

Behind the whole matter of South Africa's annexation of Namibia lurks the policy of apartheid. What, of course, puzzles world opinion is whether this extension of apartheid policy by South Africa beyond its border to Namibia is contrary to the mandate. This raises the moral and political issues in international law, since the charter of the United Nations does not cover such matters.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The administration of Namibia is basically an extension of South Africa's policy of apartheid there. South Africa's acceptance of an adverse judgment would be tantamount to reversing the mandate, but, much more than this, it would mean that South Africa would be denying its own existence by condemning apartheid. Apartheid for South Africa is a way of life. In practical terms, apartheid has meant white domination of blacks and other minority groups by denying them equal rights in all spheres of life. The Africans have no political rights from the top to the bottom of the administrative strata. There are local boards in the Reserve composed of African chiefs and local councillors. However, the whole structure is directly under the control of the Europeans, who have the power to veto any resolutions passed by the boards.

The Africans are humiliated by being required to carry "reference books" or "passes", a situation almost similar to that prevailing in South

Africa. In this context the African is required to carry his pass at all times. The purpose of the pass law is to keep under control the movement of the Africans; even a permit is a prerequisite for residence in the reserves. There is no freedom of movement from one location of the reserve to another, let alone banishment from one's area of domicile, without any chance to trial. The creation of the reserves, amongst other things, was dictated by the law of supply and demand in terms of labour. It has been stipulated that should population in the reserve exceed demand then "surplus Africans may be removed to some other locations". Likewise, anyone unemployed for more than a month, or any newcomer without a job for fourteen days, is summarily prevailed upon to leave. Certain mechanisms have been set up for labour recruitment, which is tantamount to forced labour. Normally the contracts last up to two years for unmarried men, and more often than not there are 40,000 to 45,000 men away in the police zone working for the Europeans at any one time. The debilitating effect of this drain of manpower on the families is incredible. Young men who are married are not allowed to move to their respective areas with their families. Although the contract system does not affect those within the zone, the drain of labour supply from there is equally tremendous.¹⁹

THE BANTUSTANS

Turning to the issue of the Bantustans,²⁰ the decision of the International Court of Justice not to settle the dispute between the two contestants in July 1966 paved the way for South Africa to implement its policies of apartheid in Namibia at an unprecedented rate. South Africa, having been assured of international support in its refusal to grant self-determination to the people of Namibia, now decided to make the territory a "fifth province" of the Republic.

This policy involves the propagation of South Africa's racist policies of "separate development", geared towards the creation of Bantustans, which are supposed to be independent but in practice are not. The system of Bantustans started within South Africa itself with the creation of the Transkei in 1963. It was this system that was now introduced into Namibia in 1968, enunciated by South Africa's Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Michael C. Botha, in his address at the opening session of the Ovamboland Legislative Council, thus launching the first Bantustan in Namibia. The viability of Bantustans is shown to be a farce when the relationship between population and land distribution is examined.²¹

Contrary to the South African view that the Bantustans are viable political entities, the Bantustans cannot stand on their own feet. Similarly, they are not economically independent on the grounds that they serve as a reservoir for labour in the mines. Without economic independence political independence is meaningless, for the latter depends upon the former. The Bantustans themselves were initiated in Namibia by South Africa as a

TABLE I

Allocation for:	Land Area (Sq. Km.)	Population in 1960	Sq. Km. per Capita
Natives	312,433	424,047	0.74
Coloureds	14,785	23,965	0.62
Europeans, excluding Government lands	360,480	73,464	4.92
Europeans, including Government lands	495,927	73,464	6.76
Totals	823,145	521,476	1.58

TABLE II

Proposed Bantustans	Land Area (Sq. Km.)	Population in 1960	Sq. Km. per Capita
Ovamboland	56,072	239,363	0.23
Tawanaland	1,554	9,992	0.59
Namaland	21,677	34,806	0.62
Eastern Caprivi	11,534	15,840	0.72
Damaraland	47,990	44,353	1.08
Rehoboth Gebiet	13,860	11,257	1.23
Okavangoland	41,701	27,871	1.50
Hereroland	58,997	35,354	1.67
Bushmanland	48,982	9,234	5.30
Totals	326,294	439,832	0.74

result of world pressure to grant autonomy to the Africans. The fear of the South African government hinges upon the threat of Communism; thus political independence for the Namibians, in the eyes of South Africa, would be tantamount to creating another Cuba next door.²²

To talk in terms of "political or economic independence" as distinct from "multi-racial development" is absurd, since South Africa itself has failed to delineate the implication of these slogans. In the light of our present knowledge, the definitions cover a wide range of issues encompassing self-government culminating in "a free association of states similar to that of a commonwealth".²³

In fact, self-determination is a farce, since all the evidence negates such a principle. A correlation between population and land distribution among Africans and whites reveals that the Africans are in a very disadvantaged position. The populations of Africans, whites and coloureds are divided into the proportions of 18:3:1, but land distribution is not proportional to population figures; hence percentages of 0.74, 6.74, and 0.62 average square kilometers correspond to the population figures as shown. In fact, the Europeans occupy 13/22 of the land, comprising a population of 3/22 of the total.²⁴

The South African government does not harbor any inhibitions of what self-determination implies for the Africans within South Africa itself. Thus Dr. Verwoerd's parliamentary answer in 1951 in relation to self-determination for the Africans is self-explanatory:

Now a Senator wants to know whether the series of self-governing areas would be sovereign. The answer is obvious. It stands to reason that white South Africa must remain their guardian. We are spending all the money on these developments. How could small scattered states arise? The areas will be economically dependent on the Union. It stands to reason that when we talk of the Natives' right of self-determination and self-government in those areas we cannot mean that we intend by that to cut large slices of South Africa and turn them into independent states.²⁵

Nevertheless, South Africa still speaks in the context of self-determination, but in reality the policies reveal that independence is a thing of the past as the case for Ovamboland reveals: "The progress achieved to date is obviously due in large measure to Owambo's special relationship with South Africa. . . . In many ways South Africa's contribution is irreplaceable and Owambo's progress on the road to self-determination is dependent on her present natural relationship remaining undisturbed."²⁶

In 1964 Mr. Van der Merwe in the House of Assembly spoke of the "normal evolution of centuries" during which the Bantustans would achieve their independence. Further, in 1966 a Nationalist member of Parliament made a pledge to his constituents that self-determination for the Bantustans would not be realized within the next two hundred years.²⁷

LAND

The question of land is very much connected with the Bantustan policy of the South African government in Namibia. As of 1962, when the Odendaal Report²⁸ on Bantustans was delivered, the government has decided to establish ten district homelands for the Africans, including one for the Rehoboth Basters, a coloured group. In addition, it has been proposed that three townships for the coloured people were to be established within Windhoek, Walvis Bay, and Luderitz. As the figures in the tables show, the land area covered by the nine Bantustans and the coloured townships leaves 495,927 square kilometers of land in the rest of Namibia for the Europeans.²⁹ However, the Southern African government maintains that some of this land is covered by the Namib desert, diamond areas (135,447 square kilometers), game reserves, and other unspecified land tracts which obviously are at the disposal of the Europeans.

The South African government deceives the whole world by asserting that there is equal distribution of land between Europeans and non-Europeans, but per capita figures contradict this statement, as Table 2 reveals. The average land area is approximately 0.23 square kilometers per capita. To elaborate further on the quality and desirability of the allocated lands, the South African government has insisted at the international level that the Africans are in possession of the biggest share of the agricultural resources. It is argued that, in fact, 70 per cent of the non-whites, in comparison to 20 per cent of the white population, occupy the areas with favourable rainfall. This overlooks the fact that the Bantustans support a larger population density than the areas occupied by the Europeans. In the final analysis the Europeans are in a better position in terms of rainfall, more so when their farms are developed on a wider scale using artificial irrigation. The Bantustans lack all these assets. Furthermore, the Europeans have acquired most of the loamy soils in comparison to the sandy soils occupied by the non-whites.³⁰ Although we cannot measure objectively the quality and quantity of land in order to arrive at as fair a distribution as possible, the South African case in Namibia with regard to the land question has gone beyond any reasonable doubt that the non-whites have been deprived of 61 per cent of their land by the South African government.

As if this were not burden enough for the Africans, taxation falls heavily upon their shoulders, especially when their incomes are very meagre. The Africans pay a dog tax, a wheel tax, a stock fee, and indirect taxes on cigarettes, tobacco, and a catalogue of other items. The whites are exempt from such crushing taxes. The less with less incomes (Africans) therefore support those with higher incomes (Europeans).³¹

ECONOMIC SITUATION

Namibia is on "the lips of the politicians, in the hands of farmers, and in the pocket of great mining and finance corporations".³² At first

sight Namibia may look like a desolate desert covered by scrubland, but in fact it is one of the richest countries in Africa. The country is very rich in minerals; other industries such as agriculture and fishing are flourishing. These form the major exports of Namibia. It is the first in Africa in the production of lead, sixth in the world in the production of copper, greatly endowed with deposits of diamonds, uranium, zinc, silver, cadmium and vanadium.³³ Most of these minerals are exploited by two giant companies: De Beers Consolidated Mines of South Africa Ltd., which controls about 90 per cent of the diamond production (diamonds form more than one-half of mineral production); and the American-Tsumeb Corporation, which control 80 per cent of other mineral production. Both of these companies control 90 per cent of the mineral wealth of Namibia. They both support apartheid. The economy of the country is under the control of the Europeans, who amass a lot of profit by "strict control of labour by the contract system, low taxation and generous concession grants", inducements for high investments in the country. Without the African labour the European economy would crumble to its knees.

The fishing industry, though recent, produces about 90 per cent of the total fish of Namibia and South Africa combined. It is centered around Walvis Bay, basically under the control of the Afrikaners. Together with the farming industry it forms a high percentage of the gross domestic product. Namibia is the world's largest producer of black sheep (karakul) of Persian stock, being concentrated in the arid police zone. In agriculture the Africans have been relegated to the status of subsistence farmers, but also as labourers on the European farms. Thus, the Africans have been denied the opportunity of exploiting the resources of their homeland. This is further substantiated by the denial to the Africans of any participation in mining, let alone being allowed to hold any responsible jobs in such business concerns. It is not surprising that most Africans live under the subsistence level.³⁴ Concern over the exploitation of the people of Namibia was expressed succinctly at the Namibia International Conference held at Brussels in May 1972: "South African legislation in Namibia represents the extreme example of the use of natural resources for the benefit of a closed social group with a monopoly of economic and political power."³⁵ The whole issue of South Africa's presence in Namibia is aggravated by the support given to South Africa by the Western powers, namely America, Britain, Canada and German mining companies.

Recent investigation has established conclusively that per capita income of the white workers is much higher than that of the Africans even when the workers have the same skills and experience. Thus, the per capita annual income of Namibia has risen from £59.6 in 1951 to £82.4 in 1952; but while the per capita income of the whites in police zone was £176.1, outside the police zone, particularly in Ovamboland, it was only £8.5, one of the lowest in Africa. The sharing of wealth in Namibia can further be

clarified by the following figures: in 1957-58 expenditures for the territory were £44 million; African homelands were granted £27,000, dropping to £20,000 in 1961-62. The explanation advanced by South Africa revolves around the notion that the Africans must learn to be self-sufficient. In any case, it is asserted that a rapid pace of industrialization would disrupt their society. This is very interesting, as the Africans are denied education, medical services, and good wages, although both Africans and Europeans live under the same economic system.³⁶

EDUCATION

The official policy of the South African government hinges on the principle that Europeans cannot be taxed in order to support education for the non-whites. Since the Africans cannot manage to pay for these services, it implies that they cannot receive the necessary education to qualify them for certain jobs. In fact, the only educational and health services available to the Namibians were provided by the missionaries. In 1960 the Bantu Education Act was promulgated, based on separate educational facilities for the whites and non-whites, whose objective was (a) to indoctrinate African children from childhood that Africans are inferior to Europeans, and (b) that inferiority is a status created by God which no man has a right to change. This policy is spelled out clearly by Dr. Verwoerd in his book, *Bantu Education Policy* (1954), as follows:

By blindly producing pupils trained on a European model, the vain hope was created among natives that they could occupy posts within the European community despite the country's policy of apartheid. This is what is meant by the creation of unhealthy white colour ideals and creative of widespread frustration among the so-called educated natives.³⁷

Further, when he introduced the Bantu Education Bill in the House of Assembly in 1953, Dr. Verwoerd made it clear that the Africans should not dream of ever being equal to Europeans.³⁸

In 1959 there were 15,500 European pupils in school out of a total European population of 69,000, compared with 32,000 African children out of a total African population of 464,000. In terms of percentages, this represents a school attendance by European children of about 22 per cent of the whole European population, whereas school attendance by African children represents only 7 per cent of the total African population. The Africans have no opportunities for higher learning; there are only two high schools and no university at all. Again, this is a deliberate policy of the government, as the Minister for Bantu Education laid it down in 1960 that higher education for Africans would "only cause frustration since there would be no jobs for them after they graduate".³⁹

Further, education for the Europeans is compulsory in comparison to that of the non-whites. Moreover, more money is allocated for the education of Europeans in comparison to that set aside for Africans. For instance,

the average figures for 1954-55 expenditures for African and European children attending school were £4.4 and £63.5, respectively! In terms of population figures for the whites and non-whites, the percentage of the white children attending school is far greater than that for the non-whites,⁴⁰ yet the non-whites outnumber the whites in total population figures. This is obviously consistent with the South African policy of apartheid, geared towards ensuring labour reserves for their industries and maintaining a high standard of living (one of the highest in the world) at the expense of the Africans.

THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION BEGINS

The first political organization to emerge in Namibia was the Ovambo-land People's Congress (OPC) in 1957, to be changed the following year into Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO). Its immediate objective was to abolish the contract labour system that affected the lives of thousands of Namibians, including those working in the European mines in the Cape province of South Africa. Its founder was Hermann Toi jo Toivo, who was then a migrant worker in Cape Town. In early 1962 the organization took another name, South West African People's Organisation to replace OPO, which was limited in scope and organization. The struggle was now intensified from the abolition of the contract labour system to total independence for Namibia.

The resistance movements against alien rule started in the nineteenth century against the Germans, culminating in the 1904 Herero massacre by the Germans. The political developments between the two world wars were essentially dominated by the chiefs, some of whom served as government avenues for silencing the people of Namibia. However, Chief Hosea Kutako's career is particularly significant as a leader of the Herero people. It was mainly due to his courageous leadership that the spirit of petitioning at the U.N. was kept alive, especially under the guidance of the Reverend Michael Scott. Petitioning the United Nations began in 1946. In addition, Clemens Kapuu and the Nama leader, Samuel Witbooi, in collaboration with the other leadership mentioned, championed the right of self-determination for the people of Namibia at this early stage. The Herero people, more than anyone else, became the vanguard of the nation, to be joined later by the Ovambo people. The people hoped that the U.N. would at least wrest the control of the territory from the South African tentacles, which would give them the hope of independence at some future date. Duly, they formed the South West African Progressive Party in 1952, a movement that was aimed at consolidating world opinion against South Africa at the United Nations. The early leadership of the party was in the hands of U. Kaukuetu, now the vice-president of SWANU. It was soon accorded support by the Council of Chiefs led by Hosea Kutako. Subsequently, in 1960-61, the South West African National Union (SWANU),

mainly a Herero party, was duly constituted to wage the battle against South Africa, side by side with SWAPO.

In the early stages of their development the liberation movements were torn apart by ethnic and group leadership squabbles, but these were minor impediments in comparison to the progress made by the freedom fighters as a whole. However, in 1963, after the emergence of the organization of African unity, SWAPO tended to be in the ascendancy as it gained recognition and financial support from the OAU, SWANU was denied these privileges. Earlier SWANU leadership had criticized SWAPO on the grounds that the latter's strategy of petitioning the U.N. by allying itself to the Herero Chiefs' Council was not likely to lead to independence for the people of Namibia. Thus, SWANU insisted that the struggle for the independence of Namibia could only be achieved by the people of Namibia themselves. As one commentator put it: "What is done by the outside must be supplementary to what is done here. The other policy spreads an illusion that we will get freedom from abroad. United Nations' promises cool the courage and spirit of the people, and they do not realise that they must do something themselves to attain their freedom."⁴¹

Further, SWANU rejects what one leader designates as "the reformist approach in the struggle for liberation":

...reformism has its time—fifteen years of petitioning, of "Native Conferences" with native Commissioners, of deputations to the Secretary of Namibia, of appeals to Macmillan.... We also reject the idea that our differences should rest entirely with the Big Powers. We appeal to all states of the United Nations and particularly our brother states in Africa to "act" against South Africa but the right to "decide" remains vested in the people of Namibia. It is for us to find the most effective methods to liberate ourselves.⁴²

On the other hand, SWAPO's official view maintains that SWANU has never been a genuine liberation movement because its leadership has no direct contract with the people of Namibia, with its centres in Stockholm, New York, and London. Ideologically, SWAPO asserts that SWANU is "pro-Chinese", while SWAPO itself maintains good relations with both the socialist and capitalist countries of the world. SWAPO resolves this anomaly in ideology between the West and the East by pursuing the policy of non-alignment.⁴³

They both, however, agree on the most essential goal: total independence for Namibia. This can be achieved through a series of stages: immediate termination of the mandate system, transfer of the territory to U.N. supervision, release of all political prisoners, immediate elections, and technical assistance—all these in preparation for self-dependency.⁴⁴

The test case for these liberation-movement organizations manifested itself after 1966, when the International Court of Justice delivered its decision over the case of Namibia. The veneer of non-violence was thrown

overboard in favour of armed struggle. An official of SWAPO stated that the court's failure to deliver a judgment left the people of Namibia "no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our own liberation. The supreme test must be faced and we must at once begin to cross the many rivers of blood on our march towards freedom. And as sure as night follows day, victory will be ours".⁴⁵

At the trial of 37 Namibians in Pretoria in February 1968, Herman Ja Toivo, a founder of SWAPO, addressed the court thus:

"...it is the deep feeling of all of us that we should not be tried here in Pretoria.... The South African government has again shown its strength... by passing an act especially for us and having made it retroactive. Your government undertook a special responsibility when awarded the mandate over us. We believe that South Africa has abused that trust because of its belief in racial superiority.... Is it surprising that my countrymen have taken up arms? Violence is truly fearsome, but who would not defend his property and himself against a robber? And we believe that South Africa has robbed us of our country."⁴⁶

Ja Toivo ended his heroic defense by exhorting everyone to take up arms and defend his motherland Namibia unless South Africa relinquished her position over Namibia:

"... We believe that South Africa has a choice—either to live at peace with us or to subdue us by force. If you choose to crush us and impose your will on us then you not only betray your trust, but you will live in security for only as long as your power is greater than ours. No South African will live at peace in South West Africa, for each will know that his security is based on force and that without force he will face rejection by the people of South West Africa. ... We believe that human suffering has its effect on those who impose it. We hope that what has happened will persuade the whites of South Africa that we and the world may be right and they may be wrong. Only when white South Africans realise this and act on it will it be possible for us to stop our struggle for freedom and justice in the land of our birth."⁴⁷

Despite this setback, guerrilla activity increased after 1968, especially in the Caprivi strip, "situated between the Zambezi in the east and the Okovango River to the west and south".⁴⁸ It was used to support an African population of 19,000, but now it is almost desolate, most of the land having been transformed into South African military bases. Sam Nujoma, who is president of SWAPO abroad, has realized the futility of penetrating a large number of freedom fighters through the Caprivi strip, as the corridor is heavily patrolled by South African forces. Given this situation, SWAPO has trained its freedom fighters within Namibia, itself a difficult task, since South African police surveillance is likely to detect and launch counter measures against the freedom fighters. Apart from the problem of geography, Nujoma reveals that the Ovambo chiefs' accept-

ance of self-rule from the South African government in the form of Bantustans is a betrayal of their own people. Today, SWAPO has established its headquarters in Dar es Salaam and London, a situation that removes the main leadership from gaining contact with their countrymen.

Within Namibia the chiefs do not seem to tolerate the torrent of criticism directed against them by SWAPO. In fact, the chiefs are a thorn in the flesh of the freedom fighters, since they have been appealed to by South Africa to suppress the movements fighting for independence. Chief Councillor Shiimi at the opening of Legco called upon the South African government to "please try to uncover and uproot the terrorists, mischief-makers and crooks in our midst".⁴⁹

Although the South African government does not publicize most of the victories inflicted on her by the freedom fighters, occasionally she finds it politically convenient to release the news in order to mobilize white supporters in both Namibia and South Africa against the liberation movements. Thus, in 1971, *Die Vaderland*, a government newspaper, revealed that:

The death of two South African policemen on the border between Caprivi and Zambia must bring to every thinking person in this economically prosperous country the shocking realisation that the Republic is involved in a titanic struggle. The next few years may prove to be decisive for our country's future.⁵⁰

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This essay began with the general examination of Namibia. The story begins from the time of the German takeover, through the life of the League of Nations, and now under the United Nations. The policy of apartheid in Namibia was intensified with the coming into power of the Nationalist government in South Africa in 1948. The political situation of Namibia has been examined in Section II of this paper, leading to the establishment of the Bantustans dealt with in Section III. As the question of land is bound to the issue of the Bantustans, it has been reviewed in Section IV, by pointing out the inadequacy and poverty of lands allocated to the Africans. The resources of the country, surveyed in Section V, show that Namibia is by no means a poor country. The economy, however, is basically exploited to the advantage of the white minority, supported by the South African regime, while the intensification of apartheid is very evident in the field of education, covered in Section VI. Finally, Section VII looks at the emergence of liberation movements, SWAPO, and SWANU, and their differences, weaknesses and strengths.

The dispute over the future of Namibia is complicated by the involvement of Western powers in the economy of Namibia. Most outspoken in this matter is the United States of America, Britain, France and West Germany, who continue to supply arms to the South African government,

plus a continued flow of investments into the economy of the same. This complicates the problem even at the international level, since these countries have shown their tendency not to vote against South Africa. Since the dispute involves a contest between the U.N. and the South African government, it remains to be seen whether the issue of self-determination can be resolved by the U.N. It seems that the only solution is the intensification of armed struggle by the people of Namibia against the South African regime.

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50. Vigne, *A Dwelling Place*, p. 32.

BUGANDA IN MODERN HISTORY

By D. A. LOW (London 1971) (p. 265, Shs. 35/- paper cover).

Buganda in Modern History is a collection of Professor Low's published articles, with the exception of the *Introduction* and the last Chapter (p. 227). In Chapter 1 Professor Low discusses Buganda's reception of and response to the foreign religions during the 19th Century and the revolutionary impact of these religions on Kiganda Society especially in the Royal Court. The author clearly shows that the impact had positive and negative results.

Students of European Colonialism in Africa will find Chapter 2 fascinating. The Chapter is perhaps the best demonstration of the Missionaries' involvement in the Scramble for Africa. Writing of the Christian Missionary Society (C.M.S.) campaign to win Uganda for Britain, Professor Low observes:

What was true of the South of England was true of the North. In Hull the interest was religious. There were only three meetings which sent resolutions: The Rural Deanery Chapter. The Local Branch of the C.M.S. and the C.M.S. Junior Clerical Society—and small circle in which the Bishop, a suffragan—of York and the Rural Dean were active. (p. 67).

The campaign reached a climax between October and December 1892 when the whole of the mass media supported Britain's take-over of Uganda.

In 1953 Sir Andrew Cohen, then the Governor of Uganda Protectorate, deposed and deported the late Sir Edward Mutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda. The shock to the Baganda and indeed to all the politically conscious people in Uganda was incalculable. The British expected violence and bloodshed but the Baganda under the able leadership of the Regency and the Lukiiko, sought constitutional solutions. Professor Low discusses the momentous events of the deportation years (October 1953 to October 1955) in a Chapter he calls "The Namirembe Conference", (pp. 139-166).

These conferences under the chairmanship of Sir Keith Hancock paved the way for the reinstatement of Mutesa as Kabaka. The events which had led to the deposition and deportation of Mutesa are a clear example of the naivety and short sightedness of colonial governments. They expected African leaders to be nothing more than a mouthpiece of the colonial regime, passing orders emanating from the top. When, in this case, Kabaka Mutesa rejected to continue to play that role, such an attitude was intolerable even for a fairly progressive colonialist as Sir Andrew Cohen. This Chapter further highlights an important but unfortunately the shortlived episode in the political history of Buganda. The deportation crisis had taught the traditional leadership in Buganda the need to use the best available talents in the negotiations which led to the return of Mutesa as Kabaka in 1955. Thus these negotiations

were largely in the hands of men like E. M. K. Mulira, Apolo Kironde, Ernest Kalibbala, Thomas Makumbi and Matayo Mugwanya.

The latter was the most intelligent and generally the most far-sighted among the Kabaka's chiefs. Yet the episode as we have observed, was short-lived. As soon as the crisis was over, these talents were rejected and the men were denounced as traitors by the new men who had taken over power in the Kabaka's Government. For the next ten years (1955-1965), Buganda fell in the grip of these rightwing traditionalists who paved the downfall of the Kingdom in 1966. History will judge them harshly.

In Chapter 7, Professor Low discusses the position of Buganda in Uganda but this Chapter has its shortcomings. Those arise partly *out* of a collection of articles, some of which were published nearly 15 years ago. Inevitably therefore the book cannot escape the criticism of relying on materials that is somewhat out of date. There has been very little updating of the evidence despite the time lag. Thus in Chapter 6 (pp. 167-226) where the author discusses political parties, he makes statements that are of doubtful validity, and he relies too heavily on stereo-types which will not stand scholarly criticism. Typical of such stereo-types is the author's statement, unsupported by evidence, that the Catholic Bishops in 1955 approached the Protestant Bishops to form a Christian Democratic Party. A reputable scholar should not make such an important statement without documentation. This in my view is an unfortunate error on the part of Professor Low.

But when all is said and done, *Buganda in Modern History* is an important and valuable book. Professor Low writes well and persuasively. Unlike many a political scientist, the author, who is himself a historian believed that in order to understand the history and politics of a people, one must understand their society and the environment in which they live. This makes Low's writing interesting reading. I recommend this book which is now available from most of the bookshops in East Africa.

Prof. SEMAKULA KIWANUKA,
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
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